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I. INTRODUCTION-AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW HEARSAY SYSTEM
Sections 801 through 806 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code' pro-
vide an elaborate and almost completely comprehensive system for the
admission or exclusion of various kinds of hearsay evidence. The sys-
tem is almost an exact duplicate of the one created by the draftsmen of
the Federal Rules of Evidence because Oklahoma Evidence Code Sec-
tions 801 through 806 follow the corresponding Federal Rules of Evi-
dence very closely. Although most of the ideas involved in this hearsay
system are familiar ones, the overall effect of the new system is to en-
large greatly the opportunities for the introduction of hearsay evidence.
The new system not only creates new hearsay exceptions but also fre-
quently enlarges the old exceptions it restates. It is hard to weigh the
simplification produced by the relatively clear reorganization of the old
exceptions against the complications introduced by the new exceptions
and the enlargements of old exceptions. It is probably fair to say, how-
ever, that hearsay has always been and remains a complex part of the
law of evidence.
The organization of the hearsay system is helpful. Section 801 de-
fines hearsay, and Section 802 provides for the exclusion of hearsay
"except as provided by law." Section 803 states twenty-four express
exceptions to the rule against hearsay which apply regardless of
whether the declarant who made the hearsay statement is available as a
witness. Section 804(B) adds five additional express exceptions which
apply only if the declarant who made the hearsay statement is unavail-
able as a witness. Section 804(A) gives an elaborate and generous list
of situations in which a declarant is to be considered to be unavailable
as a witness. Section 805 provides that statements involving multiple
layers of hearsay within hearsay may be admitted if an exception to the
rules against hearsay can be found for each layer. Finally, Section 806
permits the credibility of a hearsay declarant to be attacked or de-
fended.
1. Oklahoma Evidence Code, ch. 285, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws 801 (to be codified as OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2101 to 2107, 2201 to 2203, 2301 to 2305, 2401 to 2411, 2501 to 2513, 2601 to 2615,
2701 to 2705, 2801 to 2806, 2901 to 2903, 3001 to 3008, and 3101 to 3103). In this article all
citations as well as textual references to the Oklahoma Evidence Code will be called by section
numbers as they appear in the Senate Bill, since these numbers are largely the same as the num-
bers of the corresponding federal evidence rules and the numbers of the rules in the proposed
Oklahoma Evidence Code. The codification uses the same numbering system but adds 2,000 to
each number, thus a citation or textual reference to § 401 indicates codification at OKLA. STAT. tit.
12 § 2401 (Supp. 1978). In addition, textual references to the Code refer to the Oklahoma Evi-
dence Code as enacted, although the full name is also used where needed for clarity.
1979]
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The hearsay system is not as simple as the foregoing suggests. One
major complication is created by'the final exception in both Sections
803 and 804. Sections 803(24) and 804(B)(5) contain identical language
creating an exception for a statement "not specifically covered by any
of the foregoing exceptions" if the statement meets several require-
ments, the most important of which is a requirement of "equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." These two exceptions
are frequently called the "open ended" or "catch-all" exceptions.2
Conversely, a number of hearsay exceptions created by this hearsay
system do not appear in Sections 803 and 804. Section 801, which de-
fines hearsay, contains several provisions which this article will call
"exceptions by definition." Section 703 creates a partial exception to
the hearsay rules for hearsay statements relied upon by an expert wit-
ness which are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field." Sections 405, 608 and 609 permit the use of some
evidence of reputation and criminal convictions to prove character.
II. SECTION 801-HEARSAY, NONHEARSAY, NOT HEARSAY AND
EXCEPTIONS BY DEFINITION
A. How to Read Section 801
Section 801 is an elaborate rule and many parts of it can easily be
2. Rothstein, The ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of EvIdence, 62 GEo. L.J. 125,
156 (1973).
3. Section 801 Definitions.
For purposes of this Code;
1. A "statement" is:
a. an oral or written assertion, or
b. nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion;
2. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement;
3. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted; and
4. A statement is not hearsay if:
a. the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is
(1) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a deposition, trial, hearing or other proceeding, or
(2) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive; or
b. the statement is offered against a party and is
(1) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity, or
(2) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or
(3) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the
subject, or
(4) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment, or
(5) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
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misread. Indeed, the more a reader knows about hearsay, the more
likely he is to misread Section 801. The easiest way to read Section 801
is to treat it as performing two different functions. First, Section 801
draws the traditional distinction between the hearsay use of out of
court statements and the nonhearsay use of such statements. Second,
Section 801 creates four or five "exceptions by definition" to the rule
against hearsay by excluding from its definition of hearsay certain uses
of out of court statements which would otherwise be within the defini-
tion. Four "exceptions by definition" are clearly provided by the lan-
guage of Section 801. These are exceptions for (1) admissions of a
party-opponent,4 (2) some prior inconsistent statements by a witness, 5
(3) some prior consistent statements by a witness,6 and (4) nonassertive
conduct which is offered to prove a belief of the nonassertive actor.7 A
comment by the Federal Advisory Committee that drafted the
Supreme Court version of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence sug-
gests the existence of a fifth exception by definition. That comment
suggested that language which has been carried forward unchanged
into both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Oklahoma Evidence
Code8 creates an exception by definition for "implied assertions." This
article will argue that the Oklahoma Evidence Code does not create
any such exception.
It will frequently be necessary in discussing Oklahoma Evidence
Code Section 801 to look back to the creation and development of its
ancestor, Federal Evidence Rule 801. The reader will therefore have to
overcome a problem of terminology. Although Section 801 is virtually
a word by word copy of Federal Evidence Rule 801 (except for two
deletions),9 Section 801 is, nevertheless, the only section of the
Oklahoma Evidence Code whose subdivisions are not instantly recog-
nizable as the equivalents of the corresponding subdivisions of the cor-
responding Federal Evidence Rules. All sections of the Oklahoma
Code except Section 801 changed the lower case letters used in the Fed-






9. There is no subdivision in Section 801 corresponding to Federal Evidence Rule
801(d)(l)(c) (statements of identification). Section 801(4)(b)(3) corresponds to Federal Evidence
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) but does not require that a statement must have been "made during the exist-
ence of the relationship."
1979]
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804(B)(5) corresponds to Rule 804(b)(5). A comparison of Section 801
and Rule 801, however, must deal with a system in which the order of
the federal subdivision designations has been rejected in favor of one
that is somehow one step out of step. Numbers replace letters; letters,
numbers; and numbers, letters again. Thus Rule 801(d)(2)(A) corre-
sponds to Section 801(4)(b)(1). Persons using both the Code and the
Rules will eventually master this transliteration. This article will sup-
ply the transliteration in the footnotes.
In fairness to the draftsmen of both Federal Evidence Rule 801
and Oklahoma Evidence Code Section 801, it must be pointed out that
they did not take the simple view of their redefinition of hearsay that
has been suggested to the reader as useful. The elaborate provisions of
Section 801 were created by the Advisory Committee which drafted the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. That Committee attempted to
justify each of the provisions which are here called "exceptions by defi-
nition" with arguments that some unusual feature of the statements in-
volved in each provision justified treatment of that provision as "not
hearsay" rather than as an exception to the rule against hearsay.' 0
However, none of the arguments which the Advisory Committee made
in support of these provisions were directed to the basis upon which
hearsay is usually distinguished from nonhearsay-the purpose for
which an out of court statement is to be used.
A hearsay problem arises whenever an out of court statement is
offered for a testimonial purpose-that is, for a purpose which involves
treating the out of court declarant who made the statement as if he
were a witness to facts described by the statement." Whenever that
happens, the person who ought to be cross-examined about the out of
court statement is the out of court declarant himself. On the other
hand, when an out of court statement is offered for a nontestimonial
purpose in which the mere fact that the statement was made is enough
10. (Proposed) Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
293-97 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Federal Rules]. Similar arguments by the Subcom-
mittee on Evidence of the Code Procedure - Civil Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association
accompany their draft of a Proposed Oklahoma Code of Evidence, 47 OKLA. B.J. 2606, 2644-45
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Code]. These arguments also appear in the revised version of
the Evidence Subcommittee's Notes which appear throughout OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2101
to 3103 (West Supp. 1979) in the form of comments upon the enacted Code sections. See the text
accompanying notes 28 to 33, 85 to 102, 170 to 181, 191 to 201 and 215 to 261 below for discus-
sions of the individual arguments.
11. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 245, 246 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK].
[Vol. 14:635
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to prove something, there is no hearsay problem. 12 . The only question
in the nontestimonial situation is whether the statement was made or
not. Any witness who claims to have heard the statement can be fully
cross-examined as to whether or not the statement was made.
All of the situations for which Section 801 creates "exceptions by
definition" involve the testimonial use of out of court statements. This
is probably most clearly illustrated by the exception for admissions of a
party-opponent created by Section 801(4)(b). 13 This is one of three sit-
uations for which Section 801(4) creates an "exception by definition"
by the simple device of declaring that a statement included in that situ-
ation "is not hearsay." Because we already know what an admission of
a party-opponent is and what it does, we are unlikely to be confused by
that definition. We know that an admission of a party-opponent is re-
ceived in evidence for a testimonial purpose. 14 An admission by a
party-opponent can be used to prove the truth of whatever it admits.
Therefore the statement in Section 801(4) that admissions of a party-
opponent are "not hearsay" cannot mean that admissions of a party-
opponent are being admitted for nontestimonial purposes. Instead Sec-
tion 801(4) means only that the rule against hearsay is not to be applied
to exclude admissions of a party-opponent from introduction as evi-
dence. By declaring that admissions of a party-opponent are "not hear-
say," Section 801 exempts them from the ban on hearsay set forth in
Section 802 and therefore permits them to be introduced in evidence
for all purposes, testimonial or nontestimonial. 15
The reader must distinguish carefully between the true nonhearsay
which is admitted in evidence for a nontestimonial purpose and the
four or five provisions in Section 801 which exclude statements (or
other evidence) from the definition of hearsay set forth in that Section
in order to permit them to be admitted in evidence for either nontesti-
monial or testimonial purposes. The reader may find it helpful in deal-
ing with Section 801 to draw a distinction between the words
"nonhearsay" and "not hearsay." If the reader will reserve the term
nonhearsay for out of court statements that are admitted for a nontesti-
monial purpose and apply "not hearsay" to all of the evidence which
12. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 249.
13. The corresponding Federal Evidence Rule is 801(d)(2).
14. MCCoRMICK, supra note 11, § 262, at 629-30; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE I 801(d)(2) [01] (1978 & Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 4 WEINSTEIN & BER-
GER].
15. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(2) [01].
1979]
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may be admitted for both testimonial and nontestimonial purposes, he
may find it easier to understand Section 801. This article has used and
will continue to use the term "exception by definition" to describe those
provisions that I suggest might be called "not hearsay."
Sections 801(4)(a)(1) t6 and 801(4)(a)(2)"7 are two sections that
might easily be misread if the reader is not alert to what Section 801
means by the phrase "not hearsay." The kinds of out of court state-
ments involved in those provisions, prior inconsistent statements by a
witness and prior consistent statements by a witness, are ones which
were admissible under the common law only for nontestimonial pur-
poses. t8 The effect of the provisions in Section 801(4)(a)(1) and
801(4)(a)(2) that some of these prior statements by witnesses are "not
hearsay" is to permit such statements to be admitted for both testimo-
nial and nontestimonial purposes.' 9
The fourth exception by definition applies to conduct rather than
statements. Section 801(1) excludes from the definition of statement
and therefore from the definition of hearsay in Section 801(3) all con-
duct that was not intended as an assertion by the person who per-
formed the conduct. The effect of this is to permit the nonassertive
conduct to be introduced as evidence of the beliefs of the person who
performed the conduct.20 The beliefs could then be used for a testimo-
nial purpose. The possible fifth exception by definition involves a simi-
lar idea in which assertive conduct and statements would be used to
prove beliefs of the speaker different from his intended assertions.
Once again the beliefs would be used for testimonial purposes.2' The
term implied assertions is used to describe this kind of evidence.
Whether Section 801 creates an exception by definition for implied as-
sertions depends upon a question of interpretation which will be dis-
cussed later in this article.22
16. The corresponding Federal Evidence Rule is 801(d)(1)(A).
17. The corresponding Federal Evidence Rule is 801(d)(1)(B).
18. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2645; 3A & 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1018, 1126,
1129, 1130, 1132 (J. Chadbourn 1970 & 1972); MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 34; 4 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(1) [01] & 801(d) (1)(B) [01].
19. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2645; and 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14,
801(d)(l) [01] & 801(d)(1)(B) [01].
20. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(a) [01] and [02].
21. See Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay- Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence, 14 STAN. L.REv. 682, 684 n.8, and Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 294.
22. See text accompanying notes 216-261 inra.
[Vol. 14:635
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It continues to be true under the Oklahoma Evidence Code that
out of court statements that are offered in evidence for a nontestimonial
purpose are nonhearsay and are not barred by the rule against hear-
say.2 3 Thus the words that form a contract are admissible to prove
what was agreed.2' It also continues to be true under the Code that
hearsay is a particular use of an out of court statement; therefore,
whether or not a particular statement is hearsay depends upon the pur-
pose for which it is offered in evidence. Some out of court statements
may have only one possible use in a particular case and are therefore
clearly either hearsay or nonhearsay. Other statements, however, are
capable of being used for either a testimonial or a nontestimonial pur-
pose.25 One frequently used example involves an out of court state-
ment that an automobile has faulty brakes made before the car was
involved in an accident which is alleged to have been caused by faulty
brakes. If the out of court statement is offered for the purpose of prov-
ing that the automobile did have faulty brakes, it is being used as hear-
say and must either satisfy one of the exceptions to the rule against
hearsay or be excluded. However, if the statement is offered for the
purpose of proving that the driver was given notice that the brakes
were bad, the purpose is nontestimonial and the rule against hearsay
does not apply.26 The evidence might nevertheless be excluded under
Section 403 if the trial court found that its probative value as proof of
notice was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
due to possible misuse of the statement for a hearsay purpose, but the
hearsay rule no longer applies to the statement if it is offered for a
nontestimonial purpose.
Section 801(3)27 is the portion of the Code which confirms that out
of court statements offered in evidence for nontestimonial purposes are
not hearsay. It provides: "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
23. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(c) [01].
24. Id; MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 249.
25. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 166 (1978).
26. Id
27. The corresponding Federal Evidence Rule is 801(c).
1979]
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C. Admissions of a Party-Opponent
1. Introduction-The Nature of Admissions of a Party-
Opponent
It continues to be true under the Code just as it was true at com-
mon law that the exception for admissions of a party-opponent is sub-
stantially different from all other exceptions. Many restrictions which
are applied to other hearsay exceptions do not apply to admissions of a
party-opponent. A party making an out of court admission need not
have personal knowledge of the matter about which he speaks. 8 The
statement need not be against his interest at the time he makes it.29
And it is unlikely that the rule against opinion will be applied to ex-
clude anything he admits." An admission of a party-opponent is ad-
missible whenever it will aid the opposing party's case simply because
it is an admission of a party-opponent.
It was upon these aspects of the law of admissions of a party-oppo-
nent that the draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Oklahoma Evidence Code based their arguments that admissions of a
party opponent should be described as "not hearsay." The outcome of
this argument will not affect anything. Admissions of a party will be
admissible as evidence regardless of whether we call them exceptions to
the rules against hearsay or "not hearsay." Furthermore, the usual
rules that apply to admissions of a party-opponent will remain the
same regardless of which phrase is used to explain why they are admis-
sible. Nevertheless, a brief review of the debate may help to clarify the
nature of admissions of a party-opponent.
Both the Federal Advisory Committee and the Oklahoma Evi-
dence Subcommittee justified the classification of admissions of a
party-opponent as "not hearsay" with the following words:
[Aldmissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the
category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in
evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than sat-
isfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule. . . . No guar-
antee of trustworthiness is required in the case of an
admission. The freedom which admissions have enjoyed
28. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1053(1) (J. Chadbourn 1972); MCCORMICK, supra note 11,
§ 263; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 1 801(d)(2)(A) [01].
29. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048(3) (J. Chadbourn 1972); MCCORMICK, supra note 1 I,
§ 262; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(2)(A) [01].
30. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1053(3) (J. Chadbourn 1972); MCCORMICK, supvra note 11,
§ 264; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(2)(A) [01].
[Vol. 14:635
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from technical demands of searching for an assurance of
trustworthiness in some against-interest circumstance, and
from the restrictive influences of the rule requiring firsthand
knowledge, when taken with the apparently prevalent satis-
faction with the results, calls for generous treatment of this
avenue to admissibility."'
That statement describes accurately the formal requirements for the
admission in evidence of admissions of a party-opponent, but it ignores
what is done with such admissions and why it is done.
Admissions of a party-opponent are used for the hearsay testimo-
nial purpose of proving the truth of what they say.32 They are used
more often than any other kind of hearsay. Among the reasons that
admissions of a party-opponent are used so often is the fact that they
are persuasive. The judge and the jury are very likely to decide that
they are trustworthy.
It is true that admissions of a party-opponent do not have to pass
any of the tests that are designed to assure trustworthiness in other
hearsay exceptions. A party need not have had personal knowledge of
the matter admitted, and the statement need not have been against his
interest at the time it was made. But the nature of admissions of a
party-opponent provides other assurances of trustworthiness. A party
is very likely to know the truth about the matter involved and is un-
likely to have said something that can be used to make a case against
him if it was not true. In any event, if an admission by a party was
incorrect, he is in an excellent position to explain why he was incorrect.
The formal requirements for the introduction of admissions of a
party-opponent have not been restated to require any of "these facts
that do give assurances of trustworthiness, but their presence probably
explains the frequency and success with which admissions of a party-
opponent are used as evidence in courts. Mere embarrassing circum-
stances would not be so convincing. ' '33
2. Personal and Adoptive Admissions of a Party-Opponent
Any out of court statement made by a party himself which would
31. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2645 (quoting from Proposed Federal Rules, supra note
10, at 297).
32. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE 241 (5th ed. J. Wein-
stein 1976).
33. Blakey, You Can Say That If You Want--the Redfinition ofHearsay in Rule 801 of the
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help his opponent's case is admissible against that party as an admis-
sion of a party-opponent under Section 801(4)(b)(1). 34
Under common law practice this exception also permitted the in-
troduction, as an admission of a party-opponent, of any conduct by a
party that strengthened the case against him, such as an attempt to de-
stroy evidence or an attempt to bribe a witness .3  Though it is now
possible to argue that such evidence comes in as nonassertive conduct
rather than under any of the provisions of Section 801(4),36 it is clear
that it is still admissible. Counsel would be wise to continue to argue to
the jury that they should consider such conduct to be an admission.37
A party may also make an admission by adopting a statement by
someone else, and this will be admissible against that party as an ad-
mission of a party-opponent under Section 801(4)(b)(2). 31 A party can
adopt a statement by some other person because he wishes to do so,39
34. Section 801(4) provides in part, "A statement is not hearsay if. . . the statement is of-
fered against a party and is (I) his own statement, in either his individual or a representive capac-
ity .. " This section corresponds to Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
35. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 277, 278, 291 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, supra note Il,
§273.
36. Section 801(1) and corresponding Federal Evidence Rule 801(a) define "statement" so as
to exclude conduct that was not intended as an assertion. The purpose of this definition is to
exempt nonassertive conduct from the ban of the rule against hearsay, but an incidental effect of
the definition is to remove also such conduct from the coverage of the exceptions by definition for
admissions of a party-opponent. Section 801(4) also applies only to "statements," and therefore
does not apply to such nonassertive conduct.
37. The reader must be careful not to be confused by the special ways in which Section 801
uses particular words. The power of evidence that one of the parties attempted to bribe a witness
to persuade a jury that his case is questionable does not depend upon what such evidence is called
when deciding whether or not the rule against hearsay will prevent its admission. If there is a
logical argument that it is an admission of the weakness of that party's case, that argument is
available without regard to whether Section 801 describes such conduct as an admission by a
party-opponent.
It is especially important not to allow Section 801 to confuse analysis of admissions by con-
duct, for their status as admissions is already somewhat uncertain. McCormick summarized both
the uncertainty and the usual resolution:
A question may well be raised whether the relatively modest probative value of this
species of evidence is not often outweighed by its prejudicial aspects. The litigant who
would not like to have a stronger case must indeed be a rarity. It may well be that the
real underpinning of the rule of admissibility is a desire to impose swift punishment,
with a certain poetic justice, rather than concern over niceties of proof. In any event, the
evidence is generally admitted.
MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 273 (citations omitted).
38. Section 801(4) provides, in part, "[a] statement is not hearsay if. . . the statement is
offered against a party and is. . . a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in
its truth. . ." This section corresponds to Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(B).
39. See United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933 (1978), for a rare example. "Proofs of loss"
submitted to obtain payment on insurance policies are frequently offered and sometimes received
as adoptive admissions. However, the facts of those cases frequently disclose that there was no
adoption at all. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 269; 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1073(4) (J.
Chadbourn 1972).
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but almost all of the cases involve claims that a party "adopted" a
statement by failing to deny it. This theory of "admission by silence"
has been used in civil cases,4" but it has been most widely used in crimi-
nal prosecutions.4 1 The Miranda rules42 limit the extent to which si-
lence during custodial interrogation can be offered as an admission by
silence.43 It is nevertheless clear that the theory has been used far too
often in criminal cases to admit statements made to criminal defend-
ants followed by the defendant's silence in circumstances in which si-
lence could not be reasonably considered to be assent.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ex-
plained why the admission by silence theory has been so widely abused
in an opinion in which it held that a distinguished judge45 had erred in
admitting evidence that a criminal defendant had responded with si-
lence when a stoic codefendant had stated (in Spanish) as they were
being arrested, "Why so much excitement. If we are caught, we are
caught."46 The court held that it was error to have admitted that evi-
40. Great Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stephenson, 176 Okla. 295, 55 P.2d 56 (1936); MCCORMICK,
supra note 11, § 270.
41. 4. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1071 (J. Chadbourn 1972); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 14, % 801(d)(2)(B) [01]. The Federal Advisory Committee discussed this problem:
When silence is relied upon, the theory is that the person would, under the circum-
stances, protest the statement made in his presence, if untrue. The decision in each case
calls for an evaluation in terms of probable human behavior. In civil cases, the results
have generally been satisfactory. In criminal cases, however, troublesome questions
have been raised by decisions holding that failure to deny is an admission: the inference
is a fairly weak one, to begin with; silence may be motivated by advice of counsel or
realization that "anything you say may be used against you"; unusual opportunity is
afforded to manufacture evidence; and encroachment upon the privilege against self-
incrimination seems inescapably to be involved. However, recent decisions of the
Supreme Court relating to custodial interrogation and the right to counsel appear to
resolve these difficulties. Hence the rule contains no special provisions concerning fail-
ure to deny in criminal cases.
Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 298.
42. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. In Miranda the Supreme Court provided with respect to proof of silence during custodial
interrogation: "In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for
exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The
prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in
the face of accusation." 384 U.S. at 468 n.37. Weinstein and Berger state that:
[C]onstitutional developments in the interrelated areas of confessions, comment on the
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel have considerably
lessened the possibility of police abuse, since the courts have recognized that, if defend-
ant's constitutional right to remain silent is to have any meaning, then no adverse infer-
ence may be drawn from his failure to deny accusations while in custody, or from his
insistence on remaining silent in the absence of counsel.
4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(2)(B) [01] (citations omitted).
44. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1071; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, at 31-34
(Supp. 1979).
45. Judge Weinstein.
46. United States v. Flecha, 539 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1976).
13
Blakey: An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Hearsay
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
TULSA LAW/C URJVAL
dence.47
[T]he judge fell into the error, against which Dean Wig-
more so clearly warned, 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1071, at 102
(Chadboum rev. 1972), of jumping from the correct proposi-
tion that hearing the statement of a third person is a necessary
condition for adoption by silence, . . . to the incorrect con-
clusion that it is a sufficient one. After quoting the maxim
"silence gives consent," Wigmore explains "that the inference
of assent may safely be made only when no other explanation
is equally consistent with silence; and there is always another
possible explanation-namely, ignorance or dissent-unless
the circumstances are such that a dissent would in ordinary ex-
perience have been expressed ff the communication had not been
correct." (Emphasis supplied.) However, "the force of the
brief maxim has always been such that in practice. . . a sort
of working rule grew up that whatever was said in a party's
presence was receivable against him as an admission, because
presumably assented to. This working rule became so firmly
entrenched in practice that frequent judicial deliverances be-
came necessary in order to dislodge it; for in this simple and
comprehensive form it ignored the inherent qualifications of
the principle." (Emphasis in original.) Among the judicial
deliverances quoted, it suffices to cite Chief Justice Shaw's
statements in Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. 235, 237
(1847), that before receiving an admission by silence the court
must determine, inter alia "whether he [the party] is in such a
situation that he is at liberty to make any reply" and "whether
the *atement is made under such circumstances, and by such
per;uns, as naturally to call for a reply, if he did not intend to
admit it"; and Lord Justice Bowen's more succinct statement
in Wiedemann v. Walpole, 2 Q.B. 534, 539 (1891):
Silence is not evidence of an admission, unless there are
circumstances which render it more reasonably probable
that a man would answer the charge made against him
than that he would not.4"
The Oklahoma case of Ryan v. State,49 cited by the Oklahoma Ev-
idence Subcommittee as an illustration of an adoptive admission, 0
47. Id at 877-78. The error was also held harmless, however, and the conviction was af-
firmed.
48. Id. But see United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1978), in which an admission
by silence was found.
49. 451 P.2d 383 (Okla. Crim. 1969).
50. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2645.
[Vol. 14:635
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demonstrates the kind of circumstances that should be proven in order
to show "that a dissent would in ordinary experience have been ex-
pressed if the communication had not been correct." In that case the
arresting officer testified:
that he had been told by a Mr. Nakeamura upon entering his
apartment [and finding the defendant there] that he,
Nakeamura, was not acquainted with the defendant and that
the defendant merely ran into their apartment saying that his
television was out of order and that he wanted to watch televi-
sion with him. The defendant had told him [Nakeamura] that
"the cops were outside looking for a robber."'"
One of the factors which the court stressed in that case was that the
defendant was not yet under arrest when he failed to deny Mr.
Nakeamura's statements.52 But the overall circumstances are also such
that a denial was to be expected. The exception for adoptive admis-
sions should be used only in such cases.
3. Admissions by Agents and Employees of a Party-Opponent
Admissions of a party-opponent can be made by his agents or em-
ployees. The most widely followed common law rule was an agency
theory which permitted out of court statements by employees to be in-
troduced against their employer only if the employer had authorized
the employees to make statements on the subject.5 3 Employers natu-
rally insisted that they had not hired their employees for the purpose of
making damaging statements.54
If admissions are considered to be mere statements by a party that
are inconsistent with that party's present position, then unauthorized
statements by employees do not qualify as admissions of party-oppo-
nents. However, statements by employees that turn out to be inconsis-
tent with their employer's interests are likely to be useful, reliable and
persuasive evidence55 for the same reasons that the employer's own ad-
missions are useful, reliable and persuasive evidence. Many courts
have attempted to find ways to admit statements by employees either
by weakening the requirement of authorization or by applying other
51. Ryan v. State, 451 P.2d 383, 385 (Okla. Crim. 1969).
52. Id
53. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(2)(D) [011; Proposed Federal Rules,
supra note 10, at 298.
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exceptions such as the exception for excited utterances. 6
The draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Evidence developed a solu-
tion to avoid the loss of what they called "valuable and helpful evi-
dence. ' 57 The Oklahoma Evidence Code also adopted that solution
which involves dividing the common law exception into two separate
exceptions. Section 801(4)(b)(3) 58 provides an exception by definition
for out of court statements by agents who were actually authorized to
speak on that subject by the party against whom the statement is of-
fered. Section 801(4)(b)(4)59 provides a separate exception by defini-
tion for statements by an agent or employee "concerning a matter
within the scope of his agency or employment." There simply is no
requirement in Section 801(4)(b)(4) that the statement have been au-
thorized at all if an agent made it concerning a matter within the scope
of his agency or an employee made it concerning a matter within the
scope of his employment.6" The Federal Rule which corresponds to
Section 801(4)(b)(4), Rule 801(d)(2)(D), does require that the statement
have been "made during the existence of the relationship," but the
Oklahoma Evidence Code deleted those words from its version of the
provision.6 1
One frequent question under the common law authorized agency
theory of vicarious admissions was whether statements that an em-
ployee had been authorized to make to the employer or for the internal
use of the employer's organization should be admissible in evidence as
authorized admissions.6 2 Under Section 801(4)(b)(4) there is no ques-
tion of whether such statements were authorized at all if they concern a
56. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, % 801(d)(2)(D) [01].
57. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 298.
58. The corresponding Federal Evidence Rule is 801(d)(l)(c).
59. The corresponding Federal Evidence Rule is 801(d)(l)(D).
60. Weinstein and Berger state:
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) adopts the approach pioneered by Model Code Rule 508(a) and
endorsed by Uniform Rule 63(9)(a) which, as a general proposition, makes statements
made by agents within the scope of their employment admissible. No longer need
judges, in cases like those discussed above, analyze the particular factors to determine
whether the statement in question should be admitted as an exception to, or extension of,
the traditional rule. Once agency, and the making of the statement while the relation-
ship continues, are established, the statement is exempt from the hearsay rule so long as
it relates to a matter within the scope of the agency.
4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, S 801(d)(2)(D) [01] (citations omitted).
61. The Oklahoma Evidence Subcommittee recommended this deletion in order to bring the
new rule into accord with title 12, section 447 of the Oklahoma Statutes, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 447
(1971), which permits admissions in the deposition of an agent, servant, or employee of a party to
be used against that party and does not state that the deposition must have been taken during the
continuation of the relationship. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2646.
62. MCCORMICK, supra note I1, § 267, at 642-43.
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matter within the scope of the employee's employment or agency. If a
statement by an employee does not concern matters within the scope of
his own employment, it is not admissible under Section 801(4)(b)(4);
but it may be admissible under Section 801(4)(b)(3) if it was actually
authorized. Both the Federal and the Oklahoma Comments indicate
that a statement by an employee is admissible under Section
801(4)(b)(3) even if the employee was only authorized to make the
statement to his employer. The Federal Advisory Committee states:
No authority is required for the general proposition that a
statement authorized by a party to be made should have the
status of an admission by the party. However, the question
arises whether only statements to third persons should be so
regarded, to the exclusion of statements by the agent to the
both al. The rule is phrased broadly 
so as to encompass
The Oklahoma Evidence Subcommittee's Note adds: "[Section
801(4)(b)(3)] would admit statements authorized by a party to be made
by the party. The rule is broad enough to include both statements to a
third person and statements by an agent to a principal."64
4. Admissions by a Co-conspirator of a Party-Opponent
Section 801(4)(b)(5) 65 permits the introduction into evidence of
statements made "by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy." This is a conventional statement of
the rule already in effect in both Oklahoma66 and most of the United
States.67 However, in many cases courts have ignored the requirement
that the statement by the co-conspirator must be "in furtherance of the
conspiracy" in order to be admissible.68 McCormick explains:
Literally applied, the "in furtherance" requirement calls
for general exclusion of statements possessing evidential value
solely as admissions, yet in fact more emphasis seems to be
placed upon the "during continuation" aspect and any state-
ment so qualifying in point of time may be admitted in evi-
dence without much regard to whether it in fact furthered the
conspiracy. These latter decisions may represent a parallel to
63. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 298.
64. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2645.
65. The corresponding Federal Evidence Rule is 801(d)(2)(E).
66. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2646.
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the cases allowing in evidence against the principal declara-
tions of an agent which relate to the subject of the agency,
even though the agent was not authorized to make a state-
ment.69
These practices led the draftsmen of the Model Code of Evidence
and the 1954 Uniform Rules of Evidence to drop the requirement that
a statement be made in furtherance of the conspiracy.70 Therefore, the
decision by the draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Oklahoma Evidence Code to retain this conventional requirement is
one that deserves attention and explanation. Weinstein and Berger ex-
plain:
The obvious question is why the draftsmen of the federal
rules chose to retain the traditional, limited agency approach
towards conspirators' statements when they had abandoned
this concept for statements by agents? The answer is that the
draftsmen endorsed the agency approach not because they
found it a convincing rationale but because they adjudged it a
useful device for protecting defendants from the very real
dangers of unfairness posed by conspiracy prosecutions.71
Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger therefore urge the importance of
ensuring the enforcement of the conventional requirement that state-
ments by a co-conspirator are admissible only if they were made in
furtherance- of the conspiracy. Although their argument is directed
largely toward decisions that ultimately must be made by judges, they
point out that some courts do not enforce their "in furtherance" re-
quirements because of failures by defense counsel to analyze the evi-
dence to see if offered statements actually were in furtherance of a
conspiracy.72
5. Foundation Requirements for Vicarious Admissions of a
Party-Opponent
It was well established at common law that out of court statements
by a purported agent, employee or co-conspirator could not establish
by themselves the existence of the agency, employment or conspiracy
relationship necessary to make them admissible.73 Instead, independ-
ent evidence of the existence of the proper relationship was required in
69. Id at 645-46.
70. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 508(b) and 1954 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(9).
71. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, .upra note 14, 801(d)(2)(E) [01].
72. Id
73. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1078, at 176 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, supra note I1,§ 267, at 642.
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order to make the out of court statements admissible.74 Neither the
Federal Rules of Evidence nor the comments on them by the Federal
Advisory Committee and by Congress make any reference to the in-
dependent evidence requirements. The federal courts have, however,
continued to apply the requirement of independent evidence exactly as
they did prior to the adoption of the Rules.75 In conspiracy cases the
federal courts have had difficulty in deciding how the required in-
dependent evidence should be related to the evidence of statements by
co-conspirators, but they faced these same problems prior to the adop-
tion of the Rules.76
This strong federal precedent finds further support in the com-
ments of the Oklahoma Evidence Subcommittee. In their Note to what
subsequently became Section 801(4)(b)(4) the Subcommittee stated:
Of course, the proponent of the vicarious "admission
must first prove the fact and scope of the agency. . . by the
testimony of the asserted agent himself, or by anyone who
knows, or by circumstantial evidence. Evidence of the pur-
ported agent's past declarations asserting the agency, are
inadmissible hearsay when offered to show the relation.
77
6. The Code Does Not Provide Any Exception For Statements
by Persons in Privity with a Party
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Oklahoma Evidence Code
both reject one widely accepted form of admission by a party-opponent
which is privity. This ground of admissibility has been accepted in a
bewildering variety of situations and rejected in an almost equally be-
wildering variety of similar situations.78 Many of the cases have in-
volved interests in real estate. McCormick states:
The notion that "privity," or identity of interest, as be-
74. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 267, at 642.
75. Saltzburg and Redden state:
There is agreement among virtually all Circuits that before an agent's statement can
be introduced against a principal the fact of agency must be shown by independent evi-
dence, i.e., something other than the statements themselves unless the statements are
otherwise admissible under a hearsay exception. But the Circuits divide on whether the
statements of an agent can be used to establish the scope of agency once the fact of
agency is established by independent evidence.
S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 468 (2d ed. 1977) [herein-
after cited as SALTZBURG & REDDEN].
76. SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 75, at 461.
77. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2646.
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tween the declarant and the party against whom the declara-
tion is offered, justifies its introduction against the party as an
admission has been generally accepted by the courts. Thus
the declaration of one joint tenant or joint owner against an-
other is received, but not that of a tenant in common, a co-
legatee or co-devisee, or a co-trustee, so strictly is the distinc-
tion derived from the law of property applied in this context.
The more frequent and important application of this property
analogy is the use of declarations of a predecessor in title to
land or personalty or choses in action, against his successor.
The successor has been thought of as acquiring his interest
burdened with the same liability of having the declarations
used against him that his predecessor was subject to.79
The principle has also been applied in cases involving actions on notes,
some wrongful death actions, and actions on life insurance policies.80
Neither the Federal Advisory Committee nor the Oklahoma Evi-
dence Subcommittee pointed out that their drafts ignored these
grounds of admissibility or explained why they were being abolished.
It is clear, however, that they were adopting the position of the late
Professor Edmund Morgan81 which was also adopted in the proposed
Model Code of Evidence and the 1954 proposed Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence.8 2
This is one of the few situations in which the failure of the Code to
deal with a subject is enough to change the prior law on that subject.
Section 802 clearly excludes all hearsay that does not qualify for admis-
sion under some provision of law, and Section 801(4)(b) clearly is lim-
ited to the kinds of admissions of a party-opponent which it describes.
However, many of the statements which would have qualified as ad-
missions by privities in interest will be admissible through some hear-
say exception. These statements are likely to satisfy the requirements
for declarations against interest.83 If for some reason they cannot qual-
ify as declarations against interest, they may nevertheless be admissible
under one of the "open-ended exceptions," Sections 803(24) and
804(B)(5).8 4
79. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 268 (citations omitted).
80. Id; 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 1081, 1084 (J. Chadbourn 1972).
81. Falknor, Hearsay, 1969 L. & Soc. ORD. 591, 603-04. See 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1080a (J. Chadbourn 1972).
82. Falknor, Hearsay, 1969 L. & Soc. ORD. 591, 603.
83. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(2)(D) [01] at 801-139, 801-140.
84. Saltzburg and Redden appear to argue that statements which would have been admissi-
ble as admissions by privities cannot qualify under the "open-ended exceptions." SALTZIULRG &
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D. Prior Inconsistent Statements by a Witness
1. Introduction-the Three Theories Involved in Section
801(4)(a)(1)
This Section creates an exception by definition for certain prior
inconsistent statements by a witness who testifies at a trial or hearing
and "is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement." The
exception applies only to prior inconsistent statements which were
"given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a deposition,
trial, hearing or other proceeding." This Section and the corresponding
Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(A), are based upon a combi-
nation of three conflicting theories concerning the use of prior inconsis-
tent statements. Two of these theories are apparent in the language of
the Section. These two theories are, first, the accepted common law
theory that prior inconsistent statements by a witness are admissible
only for the nontestimonial purpose of impeaching the witness, and,
second, an academic theory that all prior statements by a witness
should be admissible for all purposes since the person who made the
statements is available to be questioned about them.
The first theory is the orthodox common law theory.85 It allows a
prior inconsistent statement to be admitted for the limited purpose of
showing that the witness has been inconsistent. The fact of inconsis-
tency is damaging to the credibility of the witness even if the fact finder
is not permitted to use the out of court statement for any testimonial
purpose. The orthodox common law theory has frequently been at-
tacked 6 and even ridiculed87 because it appears so unlikely that a jury
can obey an instruction to consider a prior inconsistent statement only
as evidence of inconsistency and not as testimonial evidence of the
truth of whatever was said out of court. The common law limitation on
the use of prior inconsistent statements is, in fact, enforceable in those
cases in which it is most important. In cases in which there is no evi-
REDDEN, supra note 75, at 469. If they do mean to say that, they are incorrect and have been
misled by the difficulties of talking about hearsay as "not hearsay."
85. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(1)[01]; McCoRMICK, supra note 11,
§ 39; 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, at 998 n.3 (J. Chadbourn 1970).
86. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(1)(A)[01].
87. Wigmore states:
But this theoretical and artificial nicety is overworked by some courts. . . . T]he opin-
ions are full of directions to trial courts to tell the jurors to use their mental force to
ignore in such self-contradicting assertions that testimonial value which the jurors' natu-
ral reasoning persists in seeing there.
3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, at 1007 (J. Chadbourn 1970).
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dence to prove a vital point except a prior inconsistent statement, the
trial court can, and must, enforce the orthodox theory on the limited
value of such evidence by directing a verdict against the party with the
burden of proof.
The second theory has received wide academic acceptance,88 but
was almost universally rejected by the courts prior to the movement to
adopt evidence codes.8 9 The academic theory is that the hearsay prob-
lem presented by an out of court statement has been solved by the fact
that the out of court declarant is available to be questioned about the
statement. To Wigmore the effect of the opportunity to examine a wit-
ness concerning a prior statement was to eliminate any hearsay prob-
lem with respect to that statement.90
[T]he theory of the hearsay rule is that an extrajudicial state-
ment is rejected because it was made out of court by an absent
person not subject to cross-examination. . . . Here, however,
by hypothesis the witness is present and subject to cross-ex-
amination. There is ample opportunity to test him as to the
basis for his former statement. The whole purpose of the
hearsay rule has been already satisfied. Hence there is noth-
ing to prevent the tribunal from giving such testimonial credit
to the extrajudicial statement as it may seem to deserve. 91
Arguments such as these persuaded the draftsmen of both the Model
Code of Evidence and the 1954 Uniform-Rules of Evidence to create a
hearsay exception for all prior statements by a witness who is subject to
examination concerning those statements.92 However, Kansas was the
only state to adopt so broad a version of this exception.93
California adopted a version of this exception permitting the sub-
stantive use of a prior statement made by a witness who was available
to be examined concerning that statement only if the statement was one
which was (1) a prior inconsistent statement,94 or (2) a prior consistent
statement which satisfied the requirement for nontestimonial use as re-
88. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(1) [01].
89. Id
90. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 251; 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (J. Chadbourn
1970).
91. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, at 996 (J. Chadbourn 1970).
92. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503(b); 1954 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule
63(1).
93. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(a) (1976).
94. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. tit., 2A § 84A Rule
63(1)(a) and (b) (1976).
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habilitative evidence, 95 or (3) a statement of identification. 96 These re-
strictions had two effects which helped to make substantive use of prior
statements by witnesses less objectional. First, the possibility of the use
of prior consistent statements created especially for use at trial97 was
virtually eliminated since the situations in which consistent statements
could be used were very narrow. Second, under the California rules,
substantive use was largely restricted to statements that were already
admissible for a nonhearsay purpose either as impeachment or rehabil-
itation. However, the California rules were broad enough to include all
prior inconsistent statements by a witness regardless of whether the
statement would have been admissible as impeachment. To under-
stand the importance of this, the third theory involved in Section
801(4)(a)(1) must be examined.
The third theory which lies behind Section 801(4)(a)(1) is one
which has seldom been frankly stated by either courts or scholars, but
which has nevertheless been widely applied in cases involving so-called
"turncoat" witnesses. In many, although not all, cases in which a wit-
ness appears to have changed his story after making an out of court
statement, the courts have permitted that statement to be brought to the
attention of the jury through one device or another. The most common
of these devices has been "impeachment," 98 but similar use has also
been made of purported attempts to "refresh the memory" of a witness
by reading his statement to the jury.99 In some cases the impeachment
95. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1236 (West 1966).
96. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1238 (West 1966).
97. 4 WEINSTEIN & BEROER, supra note 14, 801(d)(1)[01], at 801-68 & 801-69; McCoR-
MICK, supra note 11, § 251, at 603.
98. See Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Relevancy, Competency,
Privileges, Witnesses, Opinion andExpert Witnesses, 14 TULSA L.J. 227, 310-12 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Blakey, Introduction 1]. See also Blakey, Substantive Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements
Under the Federal Rules ofEvidence, 64 Ky. L.J. 3, 24-26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Blakey,
Substantive Use]; Ordover, Surprise! That Damaging Turncoat Witness Is Still with Us: An Analy-
sis ofFederal Rules ofEvidence 607, 801(d)(a)(A) and 403, 5 HoFSTRA L. REV. 65, 66-68, 73 (1976);
Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statementsfor Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Criti-
cal Review and ProposedAmendments ofFederal Rules 0/Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, 75
MICH. L. REv. 1565, 1612 (1977).
99. Louisell and Mueller write:
When, as is often the case, the matter which the questioner mentions to refresh
recollection is a statement relating to the issues, but inadmissible (because of the hearsay
doctrine) to prove the truth of the matter asserted, great caution is required. Merely
questioning the witness may put a statement before a jury so graphically as to give rise to
a serious risk that the statement will be considered for its truth. Of course, this fact
becomes insignificant if, in the end, the memory of the witness is indeed refreshed, and
he adopts the statement as his own on the witness stand, or substantially reiterates in his
testimony the matters asserted in the statement.
But if the memory of the witness is not refreshed, and the questioner fails in his
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device is defensible; but in many others it is not. The claim that mem-
ory is being refreshed is frequently a sham. The theory that unites and
explains all of these cases-although it is almost never stated in court-
rooms-is that the fact finder should "know" about the former state-
ments. This hearsay theory, in which the purpose of allowing the fact
finder to know about a prior statement is to permit the fact finder to use
the statement for a testimonial purpose, is not a full hearsay exception.
In almost all cases the statement comes in through a distortion of a
nonrhearsay use and is supposedly not substantive evidence. It would
therefore probably be most accurate to describe the devices under
which prior statements by alleged "turncoat" witnesses are so fre-
quently admitted as quasi-exceptions to the rule against hearsay.
The California rules eliminated all need for such quasi-exceptions
as purported impeachment and purported memory refreshment by cre-
ating a full hearsay exception that would apply to the same statements.
The California Law Revision Commission stated:
Because [the California provision] permits a witness' in-
consistent statements to be considered as evidence of the mat-
ters stated and not merely as evidence casting discredit on the
witness, it follows that a party may introduce evidence of in-
consistent statements of his own witness whether or not the
witness gave damaging testimony and whether or not the
party was surprised by the testimony, for such evidence is no
longer irrelevant (and, hence, inadmissible). 00
Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and Oklahoma Evidence
Rule 801(4)(a)(1) are based upon the California Evidence Code provi-
sion dealing with prior inconsistent statements.' 0 They are narrower
than the California provision because they apply only to sworn prior
inconsistent statements, but for such sworn prior inconsistent state-
ments they eliminate the need for a quasi-exception to the rule against
hearsay. Although they are a combination of all three theories, the
ostensible purpose, the jury may still consider what it has learned as substantive evi-
dence. This amounts to "prejudice" within the meaning of Rule 403-a kind of misuse
of "evidence"--and the trialjudge should disallow the effort to refresh recollection when
the risk of this kind of prejudice appears serious. Indeed, it may sometimes happen that
the questioner's true purpose is to get the statement before the jury, rather than to refresh
the recollection of the witness, which he may know in advance to be a futile enter-
prise . ..
3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 339, at 467-68 (1979 & Supp. 1979) (citation
omitted) [hereinafter cited as LOUISELL & MUELLER].
100. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION PROPOSING AN EVIDENCE
CODE 233 (1965).
101. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 295-96.
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function they serve comes closest to the quasi-exception for statements
by "turncoat" witnesses. The federal cases applying Federal Rule
801 (d)(1)(A) are "turncoat" witness cases. 10 2
The combination of the three theories does create some problems.
Questions concerning the requirement of "cross-examination," the re-
quirement of inconsistency, and the value of prior inconsistent state-
ments as substantive evidence are discussed below.
2. Substantive Use of Sworn Prior Inconsistent Statements
Section 801(4)(a)(1) controls the substantive use of prior inconsis-
tent statements by a witness. A prior inconsistent statement which
meets the requirements of this provision is admissible for both testimo-
nial and nontestimonial purposes. Section 801(4)(a)(1) requires both
that the prior inconsistent statement have been made by a witness who
"testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination con-
cerning the statement," and that the inconsistent statement have been
made "under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a deposition,
trial, hearing or other proceeding." The requirement that the prior in-
consistent statement have been made under oath follows a similar re-
quirement which Congress added to the corresponding Federal
Evidence Rule.' 3 The effect of this requirement is to prohibit the sub-
stantive use of the vast majority of prior inconsistent statements. °4
Critics of the "under oath" requirement argue that whether or not
a prior statement was made under oath does not determine whether it is
trustworthy' 0 5 It certainly is true that the fact that a statement was
made under oath is not a reason to consider the statement to be trust-
102. See, e.g., United States v. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238 (9th
Cir. 1977). See also cases summarized in SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 75, at 496-98 & 1979
Supp., at 180-81.
103. The corresponding Federal Evidence Rule is 801(d)(1)(A).
104. In United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (1976), the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the other proceedings at which the sworn prior inconsistent
statement must be given need not be a judicial proceeding. The court upheld the introduction of
testimony by a Border Patrol Agent concerning sworn statements made before him by illegal
aliens which were inconsistent with their testimony at the subsequent trial. The court relied upon
the similarities between the immigration proceeding before the Agent and the proceedings before
a grand jury, which Congress clearly intended to include within the coverage of the Federal Rule
corresponding to Section 801(4)(a)(1). On the other hand, the sworn prior inconsistent statements
must have been made subject to the penalty of perjury and at a proceeding. A signed affidavit
would not qualify. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 1 801(d)(1)[01], at 801-81.
105. Stalmack, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Congress Takes a Compromising Step Backward
in Enacting Rule 801 (d(1)(4), 8 Loy. CH. L.J. 251, 275-76 (1977); Ordover, supra note 98, at 69.
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worthy; but the requirement that the prior inconsistent statement must
have been made under oath largely eliminates two problems which
make unsworn prior inconsistent statements less trustworthy than
sworn ones. First, the "under oath" requirement largely eliminates the
danger that the prior statement may not have been made at all or may
be misreported. 1 6 Although the "under oath" requirement does not
require that a transcript of the statement have been taken or be used to
prove that the statement was made, 0 7 a transcript will usually be avail-
able to ensure that the statement is reported accurately. Second, the
fact that the prior inconsistent statement was taken at some sort of
"proceeding" will serve to reduce uncertainty about whether or not the
witness intended to say what he appeared to say in the prior state-
ment. 08 It should be kept in mind that if a prior inconsistent statement
was not made during some proceeding it was probably obtained by a
partisan investigator. 0 9 If the statement was made in writing the inves-
tigator probably wrote the statement, regardless of whether the witness
signed the statement. Weinstein and Berger point out:
[Mlost prior inconsistent statements used at trials are given
under circumstances where there are subtle and sometimes se-
vere pressures operating to skew the story one way or the
other. The inconsistent statement may be given to an insur-
ance investigator or an FBI agent at the time of arrest, or
before a Grand Jury where the witness can be led, advertently
or otherwise, to give a somewhat colored version of the
events. In a swearing contest between the witness and FBI
agents the witness will usually come off second best. Very few
such statements used at trial are given in a completely neutral
and unpressured setting. Skepticism about such cases explain
why the rule was narrowed from its original breadth."10
There is no requirement, however, that the prior inconsistent state-
ment have been subject to cross-examination at the time it was made.
Grand jury testimony clearly qualifies for admission under Section
106. See H.R. RaP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1974).
107. Stalmack, supra note 105, at 275-76.
108. In United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1976), a Border Patrol Agent
was permitted to testify "to the substance of the prior statements," but a tape-recording had been
made of the prior statements and may have been available as a check on the accuracy of the
Agent's testimony.
109. See Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Be/ore the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 2, Supp. at
92-94 (1973) (letter of Frederick B. McDonald) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings] for a detailed
description of ways in which partisan investigators can shape prior statements.
110. 4 WEINSTEIN & BEROER, supra note 14, 1 801(d)(1)(A) [01, at 801-86.
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801(4)(a)(1)." There is a question, however, (which is discussed in a
later section)"12 as to whether prior inconsistent statements admitted
under Section 801(4)(a)(1), such as grand jury testimony, should be suf-
ficient to sustain a conviction by themselves.
3. Impeachment Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements
Section 801(4)(a)(1) does not control the use of prior inconsistent
statements for the purpose of impeachment. Statements which qualify
for admission under that Section are admitted for all purposes includ-
ing both substantive use and impeachment. Prior inconsistent state-
ments that do not qualify for admission under Section 801(4)(a)(1) for
some reason (e.g., they were not made under oath) will still be admissi-
ble for impeachment purposes if they satisfy the appropriate require-
ments. The Code does not spell out what these requirements are, but it
is clear that impeachment of witnesses by prior inconsistent statements
continues to be proper under the Code just as it was at common law.
The Congressional Conference Committee that drafted the correspond-
ing Federal Rule expressly recognized this." 3 What is uncertain, how-
ever, under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Oklahoma
Evidence Code is the extent to which unswom prior statements by a
witness can be introduced when impeachment is not the true purpose
or effect of the introduction of such statements." 4
4. Difficulties Caused by the Requirement that the Prior
Statement Be Inconsistent
Section 801(4)(a)(1) applies only to prior sworn statements by a
witness that are "inconsistent" with his testimony. This means that the
courts will be forced to decide whether the witness's testimony is incon-
sistent with his prior testimony. This has frequently been a difficult
11 I. The Conference Report on the version of Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(l)(A) finally
adopted states "The rule as adopted covers statements before a grand jury." H.R. REP. No. 1597,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
112. See text accompanying notes 130 to 165 infra.
113. "Prior inconsistent statements may, of course, be used for impeaching the credibility of a
witness." H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974). McCormick states "The use of incon-
sistent statements for impeachment purposes when such statements are not admissible as substan-
tive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1) or as an exception to the hearsay rule will continue under the
Rules." McCoRMICK, supra note 11, § 34 (Supp. 1978). See also 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra
note 99, § 299, at 194.
114. See Blakey, Introduction I, supra. note 98, at 310-12.
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problem in simple impeachment situations. 1 5 It becomes more diffi-
cult, however, when substantive use of the prior sworn statement de-
pends upon a finding of inconsistency." 6 One problem that will
become especially important is the possibility that the witness will not
deny anything in his prior sworn statement but will instead claim an
absence of present memory about some of the matters described in the
statement."i7 This is not, strictly speaking, inconsistent.
Should Section 801(4)(a)(1) be read so strictly as to keep out prior
statements when the witness claims a lapse of memory? Utah solved
this problem by making loss of memory an additional ground for the
admission of prior statements made by witnesses."18 Both California
and the federal courts have attempted to stretch the inconsistent re-
quirement to cover a claimed loss of memory-at least in situations in
which the courts disbelieved the claim.
In United States v. Insana,"9 the Second Circuit applied such an
analysis in a pre-Federal Rules case:
Where, as here, a recalcitrant witness who has testified to
one or more relevant facts indicates by his conduct that the
reason for his failure to continue to so testify is not a lack of
memory but a desire "not to hurt anyone," then the court has
discretionary latitude in the search for truth, to admit a prior
sworn statement which the witness does not in fact deny he
made. . . . However, this does not mean that the trial judge's
hands should be tied where a witness does not deny making
the statements nor the truth thereof but merely falsifies a lack
of memory. Here Schurman had testified in detail before the
grand jury, had already pleaded guilty, and on the stand iden-
tified Insana and testified to two relevant events. Based upon
these facts, the only rational conclusion is that Schurman was
fully aware of the content of his grand jury testimony but
115. 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1040-1043 (J. Chadbourn 1970); MCCORMICK, supra note
11, § 34.
116. Weinstein and Berger state "The rule is silent as to what test of inconsistency should be
used .... " 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, % 801(d)(1)(A)[01], at 801-87.
117. Id. at [04]; MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 251 (Supp. 1978).
118. Rule 63(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence declares the following to be hearsay exception:
Prior Statements of Witnesses. A prior statement of a witness, if the judge finds that the
witness had an adequate opportunity to perceive the event or condition which his state-
ment narrates, describes or explains, provided that (a) it is inconsistent with his present
testimony, or (b) it contains otherwise admissible facts which the witness denies having
stated or has forgotten since making the statement ....
9B UTAH CODE ANN., RULES OF EVIDENCE 63 (1) (1977).
119. 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
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wished to escape testifying against Insana and thus make a
mockery of the trial. By conceding that his lack of memory
was due to his desire not to hurt anyone, he impliedly admit-
ted the truth of the extra-judicial statements harmful to the
defendant. Thus we believe that these statements are admissi-
ble not only to impeach his claim of lack of memory but also
as an implied affirmation of the truth. 2 °
Similarly the Supreme Court of California stated in California v.
Green:t21
In normal circumstances, the testimony of a witness that
he does not remember an event is not "inconsistent" with a
prior statement by him describing that event. But justice will
not be promoted by a ritualistic invocation of this rule of evi-
dence. Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in ex-
press terms, is the test for admitting a witness' prior statement
and the same principle governs the case of the forgetful wit-
ness . . .. [H]ere Porter admittedly remembered the events
both leading up to and following the crucial moment when
the marijuana came into his possession, and as to that mo-
ment his testimony was equivocal. For the reasons stated
above, we conclude that Porter's deliberate evasion of the lat-
ter point in his trial testimony must be deemed to constitute
an implied denial that defendant did in fact furnish him with
the marijuana as charged. His testimony was thus materially
inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony and his
extra-judicial declaration to Officer Wade, in both of which
he specifically named defendant as his supplier. Accordingly,
the two prior statements of this witness were properly admit-
ted . 122
However, the California courts have also held that an honest fail-
120. Id at 1170.
121. 3 Cal. 3d 981, 987-88, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498, 479 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (1971).
122. Id. If this approach is followed. . . the trial judge will be forced to make a determina-
tion as to the honesty of every claim of lack of memory by a witness who has made prior affirma-
tive statements. Because of the potential effect of such a determination, it would appear that
parties opposing introduction of the prior statements would be entitled to ask for at least a voir
dire hearing at which they might offer evidence as to the truth of the claim of loss of memory. In
both Insana and Green, however, the trial judges and the appellate courts made the determination
that the witness was lying on the basis of what happened during the examination of the witness
.... Insana was an extremely unusual case, however, in which the demeanor evidence visible to
the trial judge found its way into the "cold record." Footnote 1 states:
In the absence of the jury the court in describing the conduct of the witness used
these words:
"I have excused the jury because I want to talk very frankly here. It must be clear to
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ure of memory is not inconsistent with the prior statement.12 3 Wein-
stein and Berger argue that the federal courts should also treat at least
some honest lapses of memory as not inconsistent.
Although the Supreme Court left the matter open in
Green, it would seem that the prior statement should be in-
cluded under [the Federal Rule] if the judge finds that the
witness genuinely cannot remember, and the period of amne-
sia or forgetfulness is crucial as regards the facts in issue. This
result would be compatible with case law which suggests that
a statement of no recollection is not inconsistent with a former
statement about the now forgotten matter. 124
As Weinstein and Berger suggest, there may be constitutional
problems with a decision to treat an honest lapse of memory as a basis
for the admission of a prior statement under Section 801(4)(a)(1) be-
cause the opportunity to cross-examine such a witness would be com-
pletely worthless. However, the Utah rule treats both honest and
dishonest lapses of memory alike,'2 5 and Judge Friendly restated the
Federal Rule in dicta in United States v. Marchand2 6 as if it were the
Utah rule. He wrote "if a witness has testified to such facts before a
grand jury and forgets or denies them at trial, his grand jury testimony
or any fair representation of it falls squarely within Rule
801(d)(1)(A)."' 27 That probably goes too far.'28 Neither the Federal
everybody who looks at this witness that he is faking and he is attempting to avoid giving
answers.
"His mumbling, the movements of his face and hands show a determined purpose
on his part not to give anything unless it is extracted from him. This is to the enjoyment
and gratification of the defendant, which the defendant has reflected by smiles of ap-
proval.
"It is quite evident, in other words, that this witness has in mind avoiding testifying
because he believes it is very likely to involve the defendant.
"We are here to get the truth and I do not think it lies in the lips or the mind of any
witness to thwart the truth purposely. This is a piece of hypocracy [sic] which is as plain
as the nose on your face, and I don't think we ought to allow a mockery ofjustice to be
displayed so openly and so indifferently."
423 F.2d at 1167 n.1; Blakey, Substantive Use, supra note 98, at 16-17.
123. People v. Sam, 71 Cal. 2d 194, 77 Cal. Rptr. 804,454 P.2d 700 (1969); People v. Carter, 46
Cal. App. 3d 260, 120 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1975).
124. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 1 801(d)(1)(A)[4], at 801-98, -99.
125. See note 118 supra.
126. 564 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1977).
127. Id at 999.
128. Note, however, that a statement by a witness who claims lack of memory may qualify for
admission under one of the exceptions in Section 804(B) for statements by declarants who are
"unavailable as a witness." Under Section 804(A)(3) a person who "[t]estifies to a lack of memory
of the subject matter of his statement" is declared to be unavailable as a witness. Similarly, under
Section 804(A)(2) a witness who "[plersists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of
his statement" is also declared to be unavailable as a witness.
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Rules nor the Oklahoma Evidence Code adopts the Utah rule. It is
likely, however, that both the federal courts and the Oklahoma courts
will refuse to permit a witness to evade inconsistency through a false
claim of loss of memory. As McCormick suggests, "circumstances
clearly may be such as to warrant the judge in concluding that the as-
sertion of lack of memory is untrue and in effect a repudiation of the
prior statement, thus justifying its admission in evidence." '129
5. Are Prior Inconsistent Statements Inferior Evidence Even if
Admitted As Substantive Evidence?
Hearsay evidence which has been admitted through some excep-
tion to the rule against hearsay has traditionally been considered just as
adequate to prove the facts it states as testimony to those same facts by
an in court witness. There is nothing in the language of Section
801(4)(a)(1) to suggest that the value of prior inconsistent statements
admitted through this exception by definition will be any less than the
value of hearsay statements admitted through the traditional hearsay
exceptions. The history of Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A) raises
serious questions, however, of whether a prior inconsistent statement
admitted under Section 801(4)(a)(1) should be considered equal in
value to in court testimony.
Critics of substantive use of prior inconsistent statements com-
plained that Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) would permit criminal convic-
tions and civil judgments to be obtained which would be based only
upon prior inconsistent statements,130 but advocates of that rule replied
that the critics were confusing sufficiency and admissibiity. Judge
Weinstein stated during a discussion of the proposed rules at a Judicial
Conference of the Second Circuit in 1969:
There are two parts to the question. One involves admis-
sibility and the answer is yes. The second is, will that evi-
dence alone sustain a conviction? In my view it will not.
Those are two questions. In considering the Rules of Evi-
dence keep them distinct.
One question, and that is the only one we are facing, is
what comes in. The general rules with respect to the responsi-
bility of the bench and of the jury is to insure that people are
not convicted in criminal cases on evidence which leaves a
129. MCCORMICK, supra note I1, § 251, at 604.
130. See, e.g., Blakey, Redenition, supra note 33, at 625, and authorities cited in Stalmack,
supra note 105, at 267 n.87.
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reasonable doubt. In my opinion a conviction on the evi-
dence you presented in your hypothetical could not stand. 131
The Reporter for the Advisory Committee that drafted the rules,
Professor Edward W. Cleary, made a similar response to objections
that under the Supreme Court version of the Federal Rule even un-
sworn prior inconsistent statements might support a conviction. In a
letter to the counsel of the House subcommittee which was redrafting
the Rule, Professor Cleary wrote:
Apparently the premise that underlines the suggested re-
draft is that a statement not made under penalty of perjury is
an insufficient basis to support a conviction. The premise
confuses two distinct concepts: sufficiency and admissibility.
If every item of evidence admitted were required to be suffi-
cient to support a verdict, almost all circumstantial evidence,
for example, would be excluded. No one would argue that
this is so. Admittedly, if a judge were confronted with a situa-
tion, under the rule as transmitted to Congress, in which the
entire case for the prosecution was a prior inconsistent un-
sworn statement it would be difficult indeed to see how he
could avoid directing a verdict. 32
The idea also appears as part of the legislative history of the Fed-
eral Rule in the form of a footnote to the Senate Committee Report.
The footnote states:
It would appear that some of the opposition to this Rule
is based on a concern that a person could be convicted solely
upon evidence admissible under this Rule. The Rule, how-
ever, is not addressed to the question of the sufficiency of evi-
dence to send a case to the jury, but merely as to its
admissibility. Factual circumstances could well arise where,
if this were the sole evidence, dismissal would be appropri-
ate. 1
33
Weinstein and Berger cite the Senate Report footnote as part of the
authority for their conclusion: "It is doubtful, however, that in any but
the most unusual case, a prior inconsistent statement alone will suffice
to support a conviction since it is unlikely that a reasonable juror could
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by such evidence alone."'134
131. JUDICAL CONFERENCE, SECOND JUDICAL CIRCUIT, A DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 48 F.R.D. 39, 65 (1969).
132. 1973 Hearings, supra note 109, at 98-99.
133. S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 16 n.21.
134. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(1)(A)[01], at 801-86.
[Vol. 14:635
32
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss4/1
HEARSAY
Thus, there is substantial authority to support the argument that a
conviction or judgment supported only by prior inconsistent statements
should not be allowed to stand. However, neither Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
nor Section 801(4)(a)(1) states any such limitation; and not everyone
agrees that the limitation exists. At the same 1969 conference at which
Judge Weinstein drew the distinction between sufficiency and admissi-
bility, Professor Fleming James, Jr., responded to the question of
whether a conviction could be based upon a repudiated prior state-
ment: "That is as I understand the rules."' 135
It is not possible to tell from the reported opinions whether the
federal courts have permitted anyone to be convicted in a case in which
the sole evidence on a necessary element was a prior inconsistent state-
ment admitted under Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A), but there are several
cases in which the courts may well have done So. 13 6 Furthermore, no
federal court has so far cited the foregoing portions of the legislative
history of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
There are three reasons why it would be appropriate to treat prior
inconsistent statements under Section 801(d)(a)(1) as a slightly inferior
kind of evidence which is inadequate as the sole evidence on a point to
support a criminal conviction or a civil judgment. The first of these
reasons is the legislative history of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) which
has been set forth above. There is no reference to that federal legisla-
tive history in the Oklahoma Evidence Subcommittee's Note,137 but
that silence probably should be read as agreement with the federal in-
terpretation. It is clear, both from the tone of the Oklahoma Evidence
Subcommittee's Note to what became Section 801(4)(a)(1)I38 and from
the fact that Section 801(4)(a)(1) is almost a word by word copy of the
Federal Rule, that Oklahoma intended to adopt the Federal Rule.
There are two additional arguments that may justify treating evi-
dence admitted under either Section 801(4)(a)(1) or Federal Rule
801(d)(1)(A) as inferior evidence. One is based upon the nature of the
problem which led to the creation of those rules; the other is a Consti-
tutional argument which may apply only to criminal cases.
It is likely that advocates of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) such as
Professor Cleary and Judge Weinstein were willing to argue that prior
135. 48 F.R.D. at 65.
136. United States v. Mosley, 555 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Long Solider, 562
F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1977). See also State v. Creamer, 379 A.2d 733 (Me. 1977).
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inconsistent statements admitted under that rule would be inferior evi-
dence which might be unable to sustain a verdict by themselves be-
cause of the nature of one problem which they were attempting to
solve. That problem was the mass of unsatisfactory quasi-exceptions to
the h3earsay rule that had grown up to permit lawyers to inform juries
of the existence of prior inconsistent statements. In most of these situa-
tions, the prior inconsistent statement was introduced for some non-
substantive purpose such as impeachment or refreshing memory. Fre-
quently these statements did not really qualify for the purposes for
which they were introduced but were admitted by courts that had lost
faith in their own rule prohibiting the hearsay use of such statements.
The major effect of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and Section 801(4)(a)(1) is
to provide a straight forward basis for the admission of these prior in-
consistent statements. It was not necessary to that purpose that a prior
inconsistent statement admitted under these rules be given equal status
with other evidence. Under the quasi-exceptions for impeachment and
memory refreshing which these rules replaced, prior inconsistent state-
ments were not substantive evidence at all. It therefore made sense for
Cleary, Weinstein, and the Senate Judiciary Committee to argue that
evidence admitted under Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A) need not
be considered to be adequate to support a verdict by itself.
None of the advocates of Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
found it necessary to explain to what degree prior inconsistent state-
ments should be considered inferior evidence. Although they ex-
plained that either some or all prior inconsistent statements might be
inadequate to support a conviction or civil judgment, they did not go
on to discuss the question of how much more evidence would be neces-
sary in order to support a conviction or a civil judgment. There are,
however, only two logically possible general rules that could be applied
to situations in which part of the evidence consists of a prior inconsis-
tent statement admitted under Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A) or
Section 80 l(4)(a)(1). If a court holds that a prior inconsistent statement
is not sufficient by itself to support a conviction or a civil judgment, the
court must then apply one of two possible standards requiring that the
remaining evidence be sufficient by itself without considering the prior
inconsistent statement, or the court must impose a less demanding stan-
dard which requires only that the combination of the remaining evi-
dence and the prior inconsistent statement be sufficient.
The first standard would permit prior inconsistent statements to be
[Vol. 14:635
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used only to corroborate evidence which was already sufficient. It
should be noted that this is exactly the way prior inconsistent state-
ments were treated when they were admitted under the quasi-excep-
tions for impeachment and memory refreshing. The second standard
would permit a prior inconsistent statement to be used to support a
conviction of civil judgment if it were supported by other evidence.
That other evidence might consist of corroboration. John M. Stalmack
has argued that corroboration should be required, but that an ade-
quately corroborated prior inconsistent statement should be sufficient
to support a conviction or civil judgment.
Many have feared that a change in position allowing the prior
inconsistent statement to be given substantive effect would
probably also require that a prior inconsistent statement be
sufficient to sustain a party's case. To say that a prior incon-
sistent statement alone would in all instances be enough to
sustain a party's case is a gross overstatement This is not an
issue that is reductive to a hard and fast rule, but one that
should depend upon the circumstances of each case.
The enigma of the single, direct, prior inconsistent state-
ment, however, can be solved by a requirement of corrobora-
tion. But rather than requiring corroboration as a
prerequisite to admissibility, prior inconsistent statements
should be admitted in every case. Corroboration, then should
be a determining factor considered by the trial court when
passing upon the sufficiency of that single, direct, prior incon-
sistent statement to withstand a motion for a directed verdict,
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a judgment of ac-
quittal.13 9
Since 1964 Kansas law has permitted the introduction of state-
ments "previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and
available for cross-examination with respect to the statement and its
subject matter. . ... 40 A Kansas judge and writer reviewed the expe-
rience of the Kansas courts with that rule over a period of almost
fifteen years and indicated that the Kansas courts have treated some
prior statements as inferior evidence.' 4 1 However, it does not appear
that the Kansas courts have adopted any general standard for deter-
mining when they will treat prior statements as inferior evidence or of
139. Stalmack, supra note 105, at 267-69.
140. KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-460(a) (1976).
141. Gard, Survey oflKansas Law Evidence, 27 KAN. L. REv. 225, 226-27 (1979).
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what weight they will give to such statements. Judge Spencer A. Gard
wrote:
[The Kansas hearsay exception for] out-of-court statements
by a person present at the hearing who is available for cross-
examination, was expected by legislative skeptics to give the
courts considerable trouble because of its scope and novelty.
The effect of the exception is to give consistent and inconsis-
tent prior statements by witnesses substantive evidence status.
Contrary to expectations, no cases of consequence under this
exception reached the Kansas Supreme Court for a number of
years, and when such cases did reach the court they caused
little trouble because trial judges had shown their capacity for
discretionary control in preventing attorneys from abusing the
exception with self-serving statements. In turn, the attorneys
realized the futility of staking their cases on out-of-court dec-
larations, either consistent or inconsistent, without better evi-
dence in the record . . . . As to inconsistent statements, the
tendency is to limit the evidence to typical turncoat situa-
tions. 142
The Kansas experience reported by Judge Gard and the silence of
the federal courts with respect to the question of the value of prior in-
consistent statements admitted under Federal Evidence Rule
801(d)(1)(A) since 1975 suggest that clear general rules concerning the
extent to which prior inconsistent statements are inferior evidence are
unlikely to be developed in the near future.
Nevertheless, in any case in which there is so little evidence on a
vital point that substantive use of prior inconsistent statements may af-
fect whether or not the evidence is sufficient to go to a jury, the idea
that prior inconsistent statements may be an inferior kind of evidence
will have to be considered by the trial and appellate judges. In some
cases in which counsel bring this point to the attention of the courts, the
question may be expressly discussed and decided. Even in cases in
which the question is not discussed, however, it will be a necessary part
of the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence.
Still the absence of any express rule on the value of prior inconsis-
tent statements leaves open the question of how Oklahoma would deal
with the problems presented by a case similar to the Kansas case of
State v. Fisher.143 In that case a majority of the Supreme Court of
142. Id (citations omitted).
143. 222 Kan. 76, 563 P.2d 1012 (1977).
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Kansas indicated that they were willing to uphold a conviction based
solely upon the prior inconsistent statements of the alleged victim.'"
The alleged victim was an eleven year old girl and the defendant was
her stepfather. The stepfather was charged with two sexual offenses
involving the girl. The only evidence against the defendant consisted
of testimony concerning prior statements by the girl, who was called as
a witness by the state but denied that the defendant had done any of
the acts she had previously described,'45 and by her mother, who was
present but not called as a witness. 146 The majority opinion held that
the conviction must be reversed because of the introduction of the prior
statements by the mother, but indicated that it was willing to sustain a
conviction based solely upon the prior statements of the girl. The ma-
jority stated:
The testimony of the deputy as to what was told him by the
complaining child was sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty
if believed by the jury. In reviewing the sufficiency of evi-
dence, the function of an appellate court is limited to whether
there was a basis in the evidence for a reasonable inference of
guilt. 147
Three Justices dissented. Justice Miller pointed out for the dissenters
that there was no corroborating testimony such as evidence that some-
one had committed a crime against the child.
[I]t is shocking that here we have no medical testimony and no
corroborating evidence whatsoever to establish (1) that a crime
was committed or (2) that Fisher committed it. The victim
sustained no physical harm. Fisher was sentenced to be im-
prisoned for a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of life.
His conviction and sentence were based solely on what a
small child once said-and now denies.
Where the only evidence offered by the state to prove that
an offense has been committed and that the defendant com-
mitted it is hearsay testimony, admissible only by virtue of
K.S.A. 60-460(a), such evidence, standing alone, is insuffi-
cient in my judgment to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. It does not form the basis for that reasonable inference
of guilt necessary upon appellate review.
48
144. Id. at 86, 563 P.2d at 1020.
145. Id. at 77, 563 P.2d at 1015.
146. Id
147. Id. at 86, 563 P.2d at 1020.
148. Id. at 87, 563 P.2d at 1021 (Miller, J., dissenting). See also Gard, supra note 141, at 228.
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I suggest that the dissenting judges were correct. Although it is
easy to understand why the majority was reluctant to order an acquittal
when the wife and child changed their stories in circumstances such as
these, there simply was not enough evidence to support a conviction.
This problem could not arise under the Oklahoma Evidence Code on
exactly these same facts because Oklahoma Evidence Code Section
801(4)(a)(1) requires that prior inconsistent statements must have been
made under oath in order to be admissible as substantive evidence.
However, that requirement would be satisfied if the wife and child had
testified before a grand jury. Would a case consisting only of such
grand jury testimony be adequate to uphold a conviction in Oklahoma?
The existence of a grand jury record would make it overwhelmingly
certain that the wife and child actually made these accusations, but it
would not provide any corroboration to support the accuracy of the
accusations. Therefore Oklahoma should refuse to permit a conviction
based upon such evidence.
The final reason why prior inconsistent statements admitted under
Section 801(4)(a)(1) may be inferior evidence is that the requirements
of due process mandated by the Constitution of the United States may
limit the use that can be made of such evidence. The Supreme Court of
the United States suggested this possibility in a footnote in its opinion
in Caliornia v. Green.149
While we may agree that considerations of due process,
wholly apart from the Confrontation Clause, might prevent
convictions where a reliable evidentiary basis is totally lack-
ing,. . . we do not read Bridges as declaring that the Consti-
tution is necessarily violated by the admission of a witness'
prior inconsistent statement for the truth of the matter as-
serted.' 50
In another footnote in Green the Supreme Court suggested that
there was a "not insubstantial" issue of the sufficency of the evidence to
sustain a conviction in Green itself. 5 ' The Court seemed to be assum-
ing that even if the Constitution did not prohibit the use of prior incon-
sistent statements as substantive evidence, nevertheless such statements
by themselves might not provide "a reliable evidentary basis" to sup-
port a conviction.
However, the Court did not spell out any standards which lower
149. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
150. Id at 163-64 n.15.
151. Id at 170 n.19.
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courts might apply to judge the sufficency of prior inconsistent state-
ments. The difficulties involved in applying any sufficiency standard to
prior inconsistent statements are illustrated by the decision of the
Supreme Court of California in Green when it considered that case on
remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.5 2 In a footnote
the Supreme Court of the United States had pointed out that there was
a "not insubstantial" issue as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sus-
tain the conviction because (in addition to other reasons) the conviction
rested "almost entirely on the evidence in Porter's two prior statements
which were themselves inconsistent in some respects."15 3 Porter was a
sixteen year old minor who had claimed, in both an out of court state-
ment to a police officer and testimony at a preliminary hearing, that
defendant Green had supplied him with marijuana. At Green's trial
Porter claimed that he did not know whether Green had supplied him
with marijuana because of the effects of a hallucinogenic drug which he
had taken. The state thereupon introduced Porter's prior statements in
order to prove Green guilty of supplying Porter with marijuana.15 4 The
Supreme Court of California emphasized Porter's apparent unreliabil-
ity as a witness15 5 and stated in a footnote with respect to the trial
court's reaction to Porter:
[T]he court expressed deep concern over the probative
value of the testimony of this youth "who comes in here and
defies the Court and counsel with his nonresponsive, insolent
answers." In explaining his decision to find defendant guilty,
the court again emphasized "the small probability attached to
the veracity of this young renegade...
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court upheld the sufficiency
of the evidence. Porter's deficiencies as a witness were applied to de-
stroy only his in court denials and not his prior accusations. The
Supreme Court of California stated:
The evidence is not insufficient as a matter of law to sup-
port the finding of guilt: despite certain inconsistencies be-
tween Porter's preliminary hearing testimony and his
declaration to Officer Wade, both statements unequivocally
identify defendant as his supplier of marijuana. Far from be-
ing themselves inherently incredible, the statements depict, as
152. 3 Cal. 3d 981, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998 (1971).
153. 399 U.S. at 170 n.19.
154. 3 Cal. 3d at 984-91, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 495-500, 479 P.2d at 999-1004.
155. Id at 987-88, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 498, 479 P.2d at 1002.
156. Id at 988 n.5, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 498 n.5, 479 P.2d at 1002 n.5.
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characterized by the Attorney General, "a dismally common
story" of the exploitation of youth for the purpose of peddling
contraband drugs. Even discounting Porter's low level of
credibility, the trial court could properly conclude from all
the evidence that "I am satisfied myself that Porter dealt with
(defendant), used it (i.e., marijuana), and sold it...-157
Therefore, the Constitutional argument for treating prior inconsis-
tent statements as inferior evidence has so far offered no firmer gui-
dance than the arguments based upon legislative history or common
law usage. However, a new 1979 decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States will greatly strengthen arguments in future cases that
criminal convictions based only upon prior inconsistent statements are
a violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process. Jackson v.
Virginia'58 did not involve any prior inconsistent statements. It held,
however, that the rule announced by the Court in Winsho,'5 9 that the
"Constitution prohibited the criminal conviction of any person except
on proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,"160 meant that the proper
standard for review "of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction must be to determine. . . whether the record evi-
dence could reasonably support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt." '6' This standard was announced in a federal habeas corpus
review of a state court conviction, but it will logically apply to all
American criminal trials.
In any case in which a prior inconsistent statement is the only evi-
dence on a vital point, the court should give careful consideration to all
three arguments that prior inconsistent statements are inferior evi-
dence.
The starting point for all three arguments is the fact that a prior
inconsistent statement offered for a testimonial purpose is hearsay. The
existence of an opportunity to question the person who made the state-
ment (or who is alleged to have made the statement) is worth some-
thing, but it does not eliminate the hearsay problems. The academic
argument that all the hearsay problems are solved by the existence of
the right to cross-examine the witness about his alleged out of court
157. Id at 991, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 500, 479 P.2d at 1004.
158. 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979).
159. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
160. Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2784 (1979).
161. Id. at 2789.
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statement 62 is based upon an oversimplified view of witness examina-
tion. It overlooks two ways in which cross-examination of the person
who allegedly made the prior inconsistent statement is not the
equivalent of ordinary cross-examination of a witness. 163
The first of these differences is the absence of direct examination.
"Although the right to require strict compliance with the rules concern-
ing direct examination is one that parties frequently waive, it is also
one that can be very valuable if there is any doubt as to whether a
witness intends to say what examining counsel would have him say."' 64
Of course, this problem arises every time hearsay is introduced, but it is
a problem that cannot be eliminated by giving the party against whom
hearsay is introduced a right of cross-examination.
Secondly, the right to cross-examine comes too late. There is no
way in which the cross-examination at trial can destroy the out of court
statement.
The witness is treated as if he were two witnesses-one
outside and one inside the courtroom. Nothing that happens
to the witness inside the courtroom can deprive the fact finder
of the right to believe the witness outside the courtroom. In-
deed, if the witness inside the courtroom were to be attacked
with the usual devices of the cross-examiner and shown to be
untrustworthy, that would merely make it all the more likely
that the fact finder would decide to believe the witness outside
the courtroom.' 6
5
The fact that the hearsay dangers of prior inconsistent statements
cannot be eliminated does not mean that it was improper to create a
hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements. But it does mean
that this exception, like other hearsay exceptions, is based upon a judg-
ment as to the proper weighing of hearsay dangers against probative
value. In cases in which a prior inconsistent statement provides the
only evidence on a vital point the hearsay dangers may well outweigh
the value of the evidence.
162. See MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 251 and 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14,
801(d)(I)[01]. I But see Bein, Prior Inconsistent Statements: The Hearsay Rule, 801(d)(1)(4) and
803(24), 26 UCLA L. REa. 976 (1979).
163. See Blakey, Substantive Use, supra note 98, at 42-47.
164. Id at 42.
165. Id at 44-45.
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6. Difficulties That Might Be Caused By the Requirement that
the Witness Be Subject to Cross-Examination
Concerning the Statement
Section 801(4)(a)(1) requires that the witness be subject to "cross-
examination concerning the statement." This requirement will not cre-
ate any problem when a party calls a "turncoat" witness for the pur-
pose of introducing his sworn prior inconsistent statement. The
statement will be brought out on direct examination of that witness and
that witness will then be subject to cross-examination by the opposing
party. The examination conducted by the opposing party will probably
use very few of the tools of cross-examination 66 but the title cross-
examination will satisfy the requirement of Section 801(4)(a)(1) and
permit substantive use of the prior inconsistent statement.
If, however, the opposing party calls the witness and the prior
statement is brought out on cross-examination, the next examination is
redirect examination. Is the prior statement admissible as substantive
evidence in this situation?
There is no reason to think that the draftsmen of the Federal Rules
and the Oklahoma Evidence Code intended to make any distinction
between situations in which the prior statement is brought out by the
party calling the witness and situations in which it is brought out by the
opposing party. In provisions dealing with the admission of prior testi-
mony, 167 the draftsmen treated opportunities to develop testimony by
direct, cross or redirect examination as equivalent. It therefore seems
reasonable to regard "subject to cross-examination" as a rhetorical
flourish and not a purposeful requirement. Judge Sam C. Pointer sug-
gests "'Cross exam' may be unintended; perhaps should be understood
merely as subject to 'examination.' ""6
The federal courts have not yet faced this problem because the
cases in which sworn prior inconsistent statements have been offered
under Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(a) have been "turncoat" wit-
ness cases in which the witness has been called by the party who offers
the prior statements. The problem can be solved, however, whenever it
arises by treating both the Federal Rule and Section 801(4)(a)(1) as
authorizing the cross-examination they require. Whenever a sworn
166. See id at 45.
.167. Oklahoma Evidence Code § 804(B)(1) and Federal Evidence Rule 804(b)(1).
168. Pointer, Federal Rules of Evidence, in Proceedings of Seminar for Newly Appointed
United States Judges, 75 F.R.D. 89, 345, 353 (1979).
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prior inconsistent statement is offered under either provision the oppos-
ing party should be given the right to cross-examine the witness con-
cerning that statement. 6
9
E. Use of Prior Consistent Statements as Either Substantive or
Rehabilitative Evidence.
Section 801(4)(a)(2) provides that a statement is "not hearsay" if
"the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is. . . consis-
tent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or mo-
tive." It is extremely likely that this rule will frequently be misread as a
restatement of the traditional rule that prior consistent statements by a
witness are admissible for the true nonhearsay purpose of rehabilitating
a witness if they will rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive." 0 However, such a misreading will not cause any
harm, and a correct reading of the rule will not lead to any benefit.
Although there is no other provision in the Oklahoma Evidence
Code which deals with the use of prior consistent statements, Section
801(4)(a)(2) was not necessary to authorize the rehabilitative use of
prior consistent statements. Past practices and the logical application
of Section 106 (Limited Admissibility) and 801(3) would have author-
ized such rehabilitative use even if Section 801(4)(a)(2) did not exist or
if 801(4)(a)(2) had been amended (like Section 801(4)(a)(1)) to apply to
only some rehabilitative prior consistent statements. Nevertheless, the
language of Section 801(4)(a)(2) is broad enough to include rehabilita-
tive use and the Section will probably be cited as the rule authorizing
rehabilitative use.
The actual effect of Section 801(4)(a)(2) is to permit the substan-
tive use of the prior consistent statements to which it applies. Section
801(4)(a)(2) does not actually change the traditional rule that a prior
consistent statement must serve a nonhearsay purpose to be admissible,
but it does permit such statements to come in for both that nonhearsay
purpose and for any other substantive purpose that might be possi-
ble.' 7 1
However, it is extremely unlikely that it will ever actually matter
169. See also Blakey, Substantive Use, supra note 98, at 12-13.
170. 4 J. WIGMORM, EVIDENCE §§ 1128, 1129, 1132 (J. Chadbourn 1972).
171. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2645.
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whether a prior consistent statement is admitted for substantive as well
as northearsay purposes. A prior consistent statement will never be the
only substantive evidence on a vital point. Therefore the fact that a
particular prior consistent statement is substantive evidence will never
determine whether a case goes to the jury. And it is hard to see how a
jury could treat a substantive prior consistent statement any differently
from a limited use rehabilitative prior consistent statement. 172
It is difficult to discover why either the draftsmen of the Federal
Rules of Evidence or the draftsmen of the Oklahoma Evidence Code
provided for substantive use of rehabilitative prior consistent state-
ments. Both sets of draftsmen gave similar short and very lukewarm
explanations. The Oklahoma Evidence Subcommittee stated:
As to Section 801(4)(a)(2) prior consistent statements
have traditionally been admissible to rebut charges of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as sub-
stantive evidence as they would be under this section. See
Coppage v. State, 76 Okla. Cr. 428, 137 P.2d 797 (1943).
However, there is no sound reason for not admitting such
statements if the opposite party opens the door for admission
under the conditions authorized under the rule.' 73
The Federal Rule was based, however, upon section 1236 of the
California Evidence Code 174 and the draftsmen of that Evidence Code
did suggest a reason for substantive use of rehabilitative prior consis-
tent statements which needs to be examined. The California Law Revi-
sion Commission argued
Section 1236, however, permits a prior consistent state-
ment of a witness to be used as substantive evidence if the
statement is otherwise admissible under the rule relating to
the rehabilitation of impeached witness ....
There is no reason to perpetuate the subtle distinction
made in the cases. It is not realistic to expect a jury to under-
stand that it cannot believe that a witness was telling the truth
on a former occasion even though it believes that the same
story given at the hearing is true.' 75
Both the Federal Rule of Evidence and the Oklahoma Evidence Code
172. See Blakey, Substantive Use, supra note 98, at 26-28.
173. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2801, (West Supp. 1978) (Evidence Subcommittee's Note),
restating Note in Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2645. See also Proposed Rules, supra note 10,
at 296.
174. Proposed Rules, supra note 10, at 296-97.
175. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSINO AN EvI-
DENCE CODE 234 (1965) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 14:635
44
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss4/1
HEARSA Y
reveal that their draftsmen wished to eliminate, in so far as they could,
the necessity of explaining to a jury such "subtle distinction[s]" as the
difference between limited use prior statements and substantive evi-
dence. Although Section 106 and Federal Rule 106 authorize the ad-
mission of evidence for a limited use, many of the most common
limited uses of evidence involving hearsay dangers are eliminated by
changes which permit substantive use of such evidence. These changes
affect not only prior inconsistent statements and prior consistent state-
ments but also statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis' 76
and statements in learned treatises. 177
If Federal Evidence Rules 801(d)(1)(A) and 801(d)(1)(B) had been
adopted in the form proposed by the Federal Advisory Committee, 17s it
would have been possible to instruct a jury with respect to all prior
statements without distinguishing between those that could be used to
support a verdict and and those that could not. But Federal Rule
801(d)(1)(A) was amended to make admissible as substantive evidence
only prior inconsistent statements "given under oath subject to the pen-
alty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposi-
tion", and Oklahoma Evidence Code Section 801(4)(a)(1) adopted an
almost identical restriction. Thus, even though all the prior consistent
statements admissible under Section 801(4)(a)(2) will be substantive ev-
idence, many of the prior inconsistent statements which will come into
evidence in the traditional manner will not be. The problem of differ-
entiating the two uses to the jury has not been eliminated. Seemingly,
no harm will result if the jury either actually understands or completely
ignores what it is told about this distinction. But substantial harm may
result if the jury tries to apply an instruction that prior consistent state-
ments are substantive evidence by interpreting the instruction to mean
that prior consistent statements are to be given extra weight. Such a
misunderstanding may well arise since there is almost no sensible use
to which a jury could put an instruction from the judge that rehabilita-
tive prior consistent statements are substantive evidence. Fortunately,
the solution to this problem is easily found. Since no useful purpose is
served by telling the jury that any prior consistent statements are sub-
stantive evidence, the jury need not, and should not, be given any such
instructions.
176. Section 803(4) and Federal Evidence Rule 803(4).
177. Section 803(18) and Federal Evidence Rule 803(18).
178. Proposed Rules, supra note 10, at 293.
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Aside from the problems that may arise in instructing the jury,
substantive use of prior consistent statements is unlikely to have any
effect.' 79 The California Supreme Court at one time held that their
similar California Evidence Code Section 1236 was unconstitutional.iS°
That court also held that the error involved in applying that section was
harmless.'"
F. Oklahoma Did Not Adopt a Hearsay Exception for Statements of
Identification.
Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1), which corresponds to Oklahoma
Evidence Code Section 801(4)(a), contains an additional "exception by
definition" for a statement made by a witness who is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement. This exception applies to a
statement "of identification of a person made after perceiving him."
The Federal Advisory Committee proposed this exception, 8 2 but Con-
gress rejected this exception when it adopted the Federal Rules. 83 The
Federal Rules were amended to add this exception 8 4 in the fall of
1975.185
The absence of such an exception in the Oklahoma Evidence Code
is not likely to be significant; and Oklahoma was probably wise to re-
fuse to create a hearsay exception for those few prior statements of
identification that will not be admissible under some other exception.
Although the exception for statements of identification appears to oper-
ate "independently of the impeachment process,"18 6 in cases in which
the identification of a person is in dispute many prior statements of
identification will be admissible either as rehabilitative consistent state-
ments or as sworn prior inconsistent statements.'8 7 The only state-
179. Substantive use of prior consistent statements under § 1236 CAL. EVID. CODE does not
appear to have had any practical effect in any of the cases in which that section has been cited.
See, e.g., People v. Canady, 8 Cal. 3d 379, 105 Cal. Rptr. 129, 503 P.2d 585 (1972) and People v.
Manson, 61 Cal. App. 2d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (2d Div. 1976) cert. deniedsub nom. Manson v.
Calif., 430 U.S. 986 (1977). See also Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Presently Inconsis-
tent Doctrine, 26 HAsT. L.J. 361, 366 n.19 (1974).
180. People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 575, 458 P.2d 479, 487 (1969).
181. Id at 1077-78, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 576, 458 P.2d at 488.
182. Proposed Rules, supra note 10, at 293, 296-97.
183. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1938 (Jan. 2, 1975).
184. Pub. L. No. 94-113, 89 Stat. 576 (Oct. 16, 1975).
185. See 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 1 801(d)(1)(C)[01] for a discussion of these
changes.
186. Id at 801-103.
187. P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 388 (1973 &
Supps. 1974, 1975) [hereinafter cited as ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING],
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ments of identification which would not be admissible under those two
exceptions alone would be consistent identifications that were not even
admissible to rehabilitate the witness or unsworn prior identifications
that were inconsistent with the witness's testimony.
An argument can be made for the admission of even these identifi-
cations on the theory that all out of court identifications are far more
trustworthy than in court identifications,18  but this theoretical trust-
worthiness of prior identifications must be weighed against the difficul-
ties which the opposing party will face in responding to such
evidence--especially if that evidence is introduced through the testi-
mony of persons other than the identifying witness.'8 9 Therefore,
Oklahoma probably acted wisely in rejecting this federal exception. 190
G. Nonassertive Conduct.
1. Introduction
Nonassertive conduct and implied assertions are closely related
ideas. They are both applications of a general argument that a belief
which a person reveals without intending to do so is likely to be more
trustworthy than a statement in which that person intentionally asserts
a belief in something.19' The term "implied assertion" describes a be-
lief which someone has revealed without intending to do so. Some-
times a person will reveal such a belief by conduct that was not
intended as an assertion at all, that is, by nonassertive conduct. 192
Whenever that happens the situation may be described by either
term-as nonassertive conduct, referring to the evidence to be offered,
or as an implied assertion, referring to the belief to be proven.' 93 How-
ever, it is also logically possible for an implied assertion to be revealed
by speech or conduct that was intended as an assertion if the speech or
conduct was intended to assert something different from the belief it
188. Hill v. State, 500 P.2d 1075, 1078 (Okla. Crim. 1972) (Simms, J., concurring). 4 WEIN-
STEIN & BEROER, supra note 14, 801(d)(1)(C)[01] 801-126 to -129.
189. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(d)(1)(C)[01] 801-129 to -132. See Hill v.
State, 568 P.2d 635, 637-38 (Okla. Crim. 1977); Towning v. State, 521 P.2d 415, 417 (Okla. Crim.
1974).
190. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2645. But see Note, Admissibilit of ExtrajudicialIdenti-
fications, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 462 (1979).
191. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 250; Falknor, The "Hear-Say' Rule as a "See-Do" Rule:
Evidence ofConduct, 33 RocKY MT. L. REv. 133 (1961), [hereinafter cited as Falknor, "See-Do"J;
Falknor, learsay,, supra note 81, at 594-95. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 n.1 (J.
Chadbourn 1974).
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revealed. 194
A series of illustrations may help to explain these extremely ab-
stract ideas. Let us suppose a lawsuit in which there is an issue of
whether or not it was raining outside a particular building at a particu-
lar time. 195 One witness is available who was in the lobby of the build-
ing at the time in question. Our witness did not go outside the building
or even go close enough to the glass doors of the lobby to see whether it
was raining outside. He did, however, see a woman 196 going out the
doors of the building, open an umbrella and hold it over her head. If
the witness is asked to testify about what he saw the woman do in order
to prove that it was raining outside the building, a hearsay problem is
presented. 197 The woman's conduct tends to prove that it was raining
because she behaved as if she believed it was raining. This presents at
least some of the hearsay dangers that would be present if the witness
were able to testify that the woman called back to him as she went out
the door, "It is raining." In both the situation in which the woman
actually said, "It is raining," and the situation in which her conduct in
raising her umbrella is offered as evidence that she believed it was rain-
ing, the trier of fact is called upon to treat the woman herself as a wit-
ness. Her conduct is being offered for a testimonial purpose.
However, it is extremely unlikely that the woman intended to
make an assertion by opening her umbrella. Therefore, her act of rais-
ing the umbrella was "nonassertive conduct" and testimony that she
raised the umbrella is admissible to prove that it was raining under the
hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct created by Oklahoma Evi-
dence Code Section 801 and Federal Evidence Rule 801.
Implied assertions may also be based on assertive conduct which
was intended to assert something other than the implied assertion. For
an illustration of this, suppose the same facts as in the foregoing illus-
tration, except that a man who went to the lobby doors and looked out
at the street came back to our witness and told the witness: "I'll have to
skip lunch today. Water would ruin this suit." These statements are
194. Falknor, "See-Do", supra note 191, at 134; R. LEMPERT AND S. SALTZBURO, A MODERN
APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 351 (1977).
195. This illustration is adapted from one given by Professor Falknor. Falknor, "See-Do",
supra note 191, at 133.
196. In Professor Falknor's illustration "a number of passers-by" had their umbrellas up, 'd,
which is far more convincing than the single umbrella raised in this illustration. However, there is
nothing in the theory of nonassertive conduct which will limit its application to conduct which is
as convincing as Professor Falknor's example.
197. Id at 133-34.
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intended as assertions of some facts, but they do not appear to have
been intended as assertions that it was raining outside the building.
1 98
Testimony by the witness that the man said these things might be of-
fered to prove that it was raining. This would be an implied assertion
based upon assertive conduct. 199 Whether the Oklahoma Evidence
Code creates a hearsay exception for implied assertions based upon as-
sertive conduct is subject to dispute."° Such an exception would be
potentially far more important than a hearsay exception for nonasser-
tive conduct alone.
Section 801(1) clearly creates an exception by definition for nonas-
sertive conduct. Only verbal and nonverbal conduct which is intended
as an assertion by the person performing the conduct is included within
the definition of "statement" in Section 801(1). This has the effect of
imposing the same limitation upon the term "hearsay" because Section
801(3) requires "hearsay" to be "a statement."'2°
2. Determining Whether Conduct Was Intended as an
Assertion.
It should be apparent that the creation of a hearsay exception for
nonassertive conduct involves the drawing of some very fine lines. Al-
though the basis for the exception is that the person whose conduct is
involved did not intend to make an assertion, the fact finder must use
the conduct as if it were an assertion by that person. Therefore all or
most of the usual hearsay dangers are present in just about the usual
proportions. The advocates of this kind of evidence insist that the
hearsay dangers are not as great because they have largely or entirely
eliminated the danger of lack of sincerity or veracity.20 2 The strongest
statement of this view was made by Professor Falknor:
On this assumption, it is clear that evidence of conduct
198. It will frequently be difficult to determine exactly what a statement was intended to as-
sert. See notes 231-33 infra and accompanying text.
199. In these illustrations nonverbal conduct is used to illustrate nonassertive conduct and
verbal conduct is used to illustrate assertive conduct, but there is no necessary relationship be-
tween the fact that conduct is verbal or nonverbal and the question of whether it is assertive or
nonassertive. Thus if our witness had asked the man to whom he spoke if it was raining and the
man had nodded his head up and down that would have been assertive but nonverbal conduct.
Conversely words can be used without their being intended to be assertions. Thus the words of
offer and acceptance by which a contract is made are frequently stated without the use of asser-
tions.
200. See notes 215-61 infra and accompanying text.
201. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 293; Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2644.
202. Falknor, "See-Do", supra note 191, at 136; Proposed Rules, supra note 10, at 293-94.
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must be taken as freed from at least one of the hearsay dan-
gers, i.e., mendacity. A man does not lie to himself. Put
otherwise, if in doing what he does a man has no intention of
asserting the existence or non-existence of a fact, it would ap-
pear that the trustworthiness of evidence of this conduct is the
same whether he is an egregious liar or a paragon of veracity.
Accordingly, the lack of opportunity for cross-examination in
-relation to his veracity or lack of it, would seem to be of no
substantial importance. °3
Even if Professor Falknor were correct about questions of veracity,
nonassertive conduct offered to prove the beliefs of the actor would
present more unanswered questions as to the knowledge, memory and
especially narration of the actor than the ordinary hearsay statement
would present;2°4 but it is only by hypothesis or assumption that even
the sincerity questions are eliminated.
The hypothesis upon which the entire nonassertive conduct theory
is based is that the trial judge can determine whether the conduct in
question was or was not intended as an assertion of anything by the
actor.20 5 The Comment to one of the earlier versions of a nonassertive
conduct rule in the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence
provides, without conscious humor,20 6 that whether a flight by a person
would be hearsay would depend upon the secret intentions of the flee-
ing person:
Thus flight of a person intended by him to draw suspicion
upon himself would amount to a statement that he had com-
mitted the wrong in question, and evidence of such flight
would be hearsay evidence. On the other hand, his flight for
the purpose of escape would not constitute such a statement
and evidence of it would not be hearsay evidence within the
definition. 207
The Federal Advisory Committee did recognize that there would be a
problem in determining whether conduct was intended as an assertion
and made a procedural suggestion that really does not solve the prob-
lem:
When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory that it
is not a statement, and hence not hearsay, a preliminary de-
203. Falknor, "See-Do" supra note 191, at 136.
204. Finman, supra note 21, at 684-86, 688-89; Blakey, RedeFnition, supra note 33, at 611-16.
205. Finman, supra note 21 at 686-88, 695-97.
206. See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1048-51 (5th Cir. 1977).
207. ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 228 (1942).
[Vol. 14:635
50
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 14 [1978], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol14/iss4/1
termination will be required to determine whether an asser-
tion is intended. The rule is so worded as to place the burden
upon the party claiming that the intention existed; ambiguous
and doubtful cases will be resolved against him and in favor
of admissibility. The determination involves no greater diffi-
culty than many other preliminary questions of fact.2"8
The Federal Advisory Committee's suggestion that the wording of Fed-
eral Rule 801 (and Section 801) places the burden of showing that the
actor did or did not intend to make an assertion upon either party is
questionable. However, such a rule20 9 would merely be a means of
avoiding rather than answering the question of whether the conduct
was intended to be assertive.210 Trial courts will frequently be con-
fronted with a very difficult decision as to whether a particular act was
intended to be an assertion.
3. Weighing the Probative Value of Nonassertive Conduct.
Whenever a trial court does find that the offered conduct should be
considered nonassertive, it will then face a second question: Is the con-
duct sufficiently strong evidence of a relevant belief to justify its admis-
sion? The California case of People v. Clark21 illustrates a situation in
which the conduct in question was almost certainly nonassertive but
should, nevertheless, have been excluded from evidence.
The defendant in People v. Clark was convicted of second degree
murder. The evidence of his guilt was so overwhelming that no rever-
sal would have been necessary even if the appellate court had found
error in the introduction of the nonassertive conduct evidence.21 2 The
nonassertive conduct issue involved a jacket with a fur-lined collar
which was part of the description of the defendant on the night in ques-
tion given by various witnesses. The California Court of Appeals for
the Fifth District summarized the nonassertive conduct issue as follows:
Defendant's remaining contentions are of no conse-
quence and need not detain us long. He complains because
208. Proposed Rules, supra note 10, at 294 (citation omitted).
209. McCormick and Maguire would also place the burden of proving "assertive intent" on
the party opposing the evidence, MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 599; Maguire, The Hearsay Sys-
tem: Aroundand Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv. 741, 766 (1961). Falknor would assume
some conduct to be non-assertive, Falknor, "See-Do", supra note 191, at 136 n.13. But as Maguire
points out "it is far from clear that actual court practice embodies this procedural rule." Maguire,
The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741, 766 (1966).
210. Finman, supra note 21, at 695-97.
211. 6 Cal. App. 3d 658, 86 Cal. Rptr. 106 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
212. Id at 661-63, 665-66, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 107-12.
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the court allowed Sergeant Tabler to testify that when he
asked defendant if he had a jacket with a fur-lined collar, de-
fendant turned to his wife and stated, "I don't have one like
that, do I dear," and his wife fainted. The reaction of defend-
ant's wife to this question was relevant to prove that defend-
ant owned a coat with a fur-lined collar and that he had worn
it on the night of the murder; and because it was non-assertive
conduct it was not objectionable hearsay (Evid. Code §§ 225,
1200). E13
A trial court must apply Section 403 to control the use of nonasser-
tive conduct evidence.El4 Evidence which is offered for the purpose of
proving what it does not assert is necessarily vague and that vagueness
ought to be treated as a weakness. If the courts are not careful, how-
ever, the vagueness may be misused as if it were a strength, for that
vagueness invites treating evidence as proving whatever needs to be
proven when it actually proves nothing at all.
H. The Oklahoma Evidence Code Does Not Create a Hearsay
Exception for "Implied Assertions" Based Upon Assertive
Conduct.
Two different theories are frequently mixed together in discussions
of implied assertions. Both theories are based upon the argument that
verbal or nonverbal conduct which indirectly indicates a belief on the
part of the actor is more reliable than an ordinary hearsay statement by
that same person asserting that same belief."z 5 The first theory is that
an exception to the rule against hearsay should be created for conduct
offered to prove the actor's belief if the conduct was not intended as an
assertion at all. 2 16 The second (and similar) theory is that a hearsay
exception should be created for conduct regardless of whether it was
intended as an assertion so long as it was not intended as an assertion
of the belief which it is now offered to prove.21 7 The second theory is
213. Id at 668, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
214. See CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSING AN EVI-
DENCE CODE 223 (1965); Falknor, "See-Do", supra note 191, at 138. But see, Finman, spra note
21, at 703-06.
215. Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARV. L. REV. 146, 148 (1912); Falknor,
"See-Do", supra note 191 at 136; Falknor, Hearsay, supra note 81, at 594-95; MCCORMICK, supra
note 11, § 250; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(a)[01]; LILLY, supra note 25, § 51.
216. Id
217. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 250. See Falknor, "See-Do," supra note 191, at 134;
Finman, supra note 21, at 684 n.8.
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far broader than the first and adoption of the second theory would
eliminate any need to consider the first theory. Discussions have, how-
ever, tended either to concentrate on the first theory218 or to combine
the two. 219 The language of the Model Code adopts both theories.
220
Federal Evidence Rule 801 and Oklahoma Evidence Code Section 801
clearly adopt the first theory.22 ' Whether they also adopt the second
theory is open to dispute. It is the opinion of this writer that they do
not.
It might be argued that Federal Evidence Rule 801(c) and
Oklahoma Evidence Code Section 801(3) create an exception for state-
ments used to prove a belief they did not originally assert. They both
provide that "Hearsay" is an out of court statement offered "to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." The words "the matter asserted"
might be read in either of two ways.22 2 They might be read as referring
to whatever the statement itself appears to assert. However, they also
might be read as referring only to whatever the out of court declarant
who made the statement originally intended to assert.
The second, narrower possible reading would turn the Federal and
Oklahoma rule into the Model Code Rule that a hearsay statement was
a statement offered "to prove the truth of the matter intended to be
asserted or assumed to be so intended. .. 223
The language used in the Federal and Oklahoma rule is much less
forceful than the language used in the Model Code. The requirement
that the statement be offered to prove "the truth of the matter asserted"
could logically be satisfied if the statement was offered to prove the
truth of an implied assertion. On the other hand, it could be argued
that only an express assertion was "the matter asserted."
218. ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 225-228; CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSING AN EVIDENCE CODE at 222-23 (1965).
219. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 801(a)[01]; 11 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 801.10 (1976); Lilly, supra note 25, § 51.
220. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 501 (1942).
221. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 293; Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2644.
222. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 187, 1975 Supp. 373 n.1. Rothstein stated:
The "matter asserted" language in Rule 801(c) could refer to either the express or im-
plied assertion. A discernible drafting intent throughout the whole of Article VIII, to
narrow the hearsay rule, was originally manifest .... This would help resolve the ques-
tion posed in favor of concluding the evidence is not hearsay. But that intention to some
extent got reversed. See what Congress did to the Rules just enumerated. See also Sen-
ate, House, and Conference Report to Article VIII.
Id But see also: P. ROTHSTEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES 327 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES]; Note, State of
Mind- The Elusive Exception, 9 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 203-07 (1976).
223. ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 501 (1942).
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The question of what such an ambiguous rule means is likely to
become confused with the question of what is the most desirable
rule.224 Nonassertive conduct and implied assertions are not more
trustworthy than ordinary hearsay. 25 Indeed, because the trier of fact
must speculate as to what beliefs are proven by such evidence they are
frequently likely to be less trustworthy than ordinary hearsay.2 26 The
theory that nonassertion can be used to select which items of hearsay
should be admissible presents essentially the same dangers as the simi-
lar use of the "state of mind" exception. Just as counsel, if permitted to
do so, might turn every out of court statement into evidence of a state
of mind, counsel may also be able to turn every out of court statement
into an implied assertion of some statement very similar to itself.
The realization that a state of mind analysis of out of court state-
ments might be used to totally destroy the rule against hearsay has led
to the adoption of a prohibition on the use of that exception to prove
past acts.227 It ought also to have led, however, to questions about how
it could be possible for a hearsay exception to destroy the rule against
hearsay. One answer to such questions is that the idea of state of mind
has no relationship whatsoever to the trustworthiness problems against
which the hearsay rule is directed. There are items of evidence that can
be described as state of mind that do appear to be trustworthy, but
there is nothing in the idea of "state of mind" that provides that trust-
worthiness. Similarly, some nonassertive acts or implied assertions ap-
pear to be valuable evidence, but there is nothing in the nature of
implied assertions that makes it likely that such evidence will be more
trustworthy than ordinary hearsay.228 The fact that state of mind and
nonassertion are not based upon a test of trustworthiness makes them
powerful tools for the admission of hearsay evidence which could not
be admitted under the exceptions that do seek to identify trustworthi-
ness.
224. In dealing with such ambiguous language it well may be proper to ask what would be the
wisest and fairest rule. As Professor Callahan asked while attempting to analyze adverse posses-
sion, "How can we possibly answer any of those questions without inquiring as to our purpose?"
C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 81 (1961).
225. Finman, supra note 21, at 689-90, 692-93, 707-10; McCormick, The Borderland ofHear-
say, 39 YALE L.J. 489, 491-504 (1930); Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REV.
1138, 1141-43 (1935). But see Morgan, Hearsay, 25 Miss. L.J. 1, 8 (1953); Falknor, Silence as
Hearsay, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 216-17 (1940); Blakey, Red/Inition, supra note 33, at 611-16.
226. Finman, supra note 21, at 688-89.
227. Federal Evidence Rule and Oklahoma Evidence Code Section 803(3). See Proposed
Rules, supra note 10, at 305-06; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 803(3)[05].
228. Blakey, Redefinition, supra note 33, at 611-16; Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 957, 972 (1974).
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Several writers have recognized that much of the evidence which
might be admitted as implied assertions is not trustworthy and have
attempted to suggest ways in which a hearsay exception for implied
assertions might be restricted to trustworthy evidence.229 However,
Federal Rule 801(c) and Section 801(3) do not adopt any of those sug-
gested restrictions and if they do create a hearsay exception for implied
assertions based upon assertive conduct, that exception will apply to all
implied assertions based upon assertive conduct. Of course, Section
403 can be used to exclude such evidence when its lack of probative
value is very clear. That is unlikely to be a satisfactory solution, how-
ever, for the same reasons that Section 403 would not be a satisfactory
substitute for the entire rule against hearsay. Professor Finman argues
that such a balancing test would be particularly hard to apply to im-
plied assertions.23°
Finally, it should be pointed out that courts will have enormous
difficulty in applying a hearsay exception based upon a distinction be-
tween direct assertions and implied assertions because that distinction
does not actually exist. In our ordinary use of language neither the
speaker nor the listener draws any distinction between direct assertions
and implied assertions. Instead, both the speaker and the listener treat
a statement as meaning both what it actually states and the many
closely related ideas that it implies. Seligman pointed out in his pio-
neering article23 1 on nonassertive conduct and state of mind that many
implied assertions are part of what the speaker intends to assert.232 The
distinction which the courts would be required to draw if Federal Rule
801(c) and Section 801(3) do create a hearsay exception for implied
assertions based upon assertive conduct will be a. theoretical distinction
between the ideas the speaker did intend to imply and the ideas which
he also implied without intending to do so. This is a distinction which
the speaker himself would frequently be unable to draw. It is likely to
present difficulty for the courts.233
229. McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489, 504 (1930); Morgan, Hearsay
andNon-Hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138, 1158-60 (1935); Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, 88 U. PA.
L. REV. 192, 216-17; Maguire, The Hearsay System: Aroundand Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L.
REV. 741, 768-73 (1961); and Finman, supra note 21, at 707-09.
230. Finman, supra note 21, at 701-06.
231. Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARV. L. REV. 146 (1912).
232. Id at 150-51 & n.13.
233. The difficulties which the courts will face are illustrated by two federal cases in which the
courts reached what were probably correct decisions that particular items of evidence were prop-
erly admitted but in which the courts made arguments that a nametag on a briefcase is not an
assertion of ownership, United States v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441,443-44 (9th Cir. 1975), and that FAA
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The strongest evidence that Federal Evidence Rule 801(c) did cre-
ate an exception to the hearsay rule for implied assertions based upon
assertive conduct is an indirect reference in the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Federal Rule 801(a). After discussing nonassertive
conduct,234 the Committee stated: "Similar considerations govern
nonassertive verbal conduct and verbal conduct which is assertive but
offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter as-
serted, also excluded from the definition of hearsay by the language of
subdivision (c). ' '235 That comment suggests that the Committee did
think that Federal Rule 801(c) created a hearsay exception for verbal
and nonverbal conduct offered to prove a belief whenever the actor did
not originally intend to assert that belief.
In an earlier article I suggested that the federal courts were likely
to follow the interpretation apparently assumed by the Federal Advi-
sory Committee.236 I am now suggesting that Oklahoma should reject
that apparent interpretation. There are three reasons why Oklahoma
Evidence Code Section 801(3) ought not to be read as creating a hear-
say exception for implied assertions based upon assertive conduct. The
first two reasons apply to the federal rule as well; the third reason ap-
plies only to Oklahoma.
The first reason is the language of the rules. There is nothing in
Federal Rule 801(c) or Section 801(3) which announces that the com-
mon law is being changed. It should be kept in mind that each of these
rules is a restatement of the basic common law rule which distinguished
between testimonial use and nontestimonial use of an out of court
statement.237 It therefore has two vital functions to serve without con-
sidering the present question. First, it permits the introduction of out
of court statements which could not be used for a testimonial purpose
such as the words of a contract. 38 Secondly, it permits the introduction
of out of court statements which could be used for a testimonial pur-
pose but which are being offered only for a nontestimonial purpose.
(Thus an out of court statement that the brakes on an automobile are
circulars containing recommended landing procedures might be merely implied assertions that
those were the proper procedures, Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d 1178,
1181 n.6. (5th Cir. 1975).
234. Proposed Rules, supra note 10, at 293-94.
235. Id at 294.
236. Blakey, Redofnition, supra note 33, at 611.
237. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, J 801(c)[01]; MCCORMICK, supra note 11, § 249;
Proposed Rules, supra note 10, at 294-95.
238. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 1 801(c)[01] at 801-65 to -66.
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bad can be offered for the nontestimonial purpose of showing notice
rather than the testimonial purpose of showing that the brakes were in
fact bad.)23 9 Every word of these rules is necessary to serve those two
functions. There is nothing in Federal Rule 801(c) and Section 801(3)
to which an opponent of an exception such as we are discussing should
be expected to object. This is in sharp contrast to the language in Fed-
eral Rule 801(a) and Section 801(1) which clearly spells out the crea-
tion of an exception for nonassertive conduct.
Secondly, the legislative history of the Federal Rule will not sup-
port an argument that Federal Rule 801(c) creates the disputed excep-
tion. The Federal Rules of Evidence were actually adopted by
Congress as legislation.240 There is no reference in any of the Congres-
sional reports to the creation of this exception. 24' There is also, admit-
tedly, no reference to the exception created by Rule 801(a) for
nonassertive conduct,242 but there is no question about the adoption of
that exception.
The legislative history supporting an argument that Federal Rule
801(c) creates a hearsay exception for implied assertions, therefore,
consists only of the comment by the Federal Advisory Committee
quoted above. There will be situations in which a single sentence in the
Advisory Committee's Notes will determine the meaning of a Federal
Rule, but this is not such a situation. This sentence is too subtle, too
ambiguous, and placed in the wrong part of the Note to Federal Rule
801. There is nothing in the comment on Subdivision (c) that indicates
that the common law is being changed at all.243 Indeed that comment
239. Id. at 801-70 to -72; LILLY, supra note 25, at 166.
240. An Act, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1296 (Jan. 2, 1975).
241. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); and H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
242. Id, but see Hearings on Federal Rules ofEvidence Before the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 156-58 (written statement of Richard H. Keating
and John T. Blanchard).
243. The entire comment on Subdivision (c) by the Federal Advisory Committee stated:
Subdivision (c). The definition follows along familiar lines in including only state-
ments offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. McCormick § 225; 5 Wigmore
§ 1361, 6 id § 1766. If the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that
it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is
not hearsay. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1950),
rev'd on other grounds 340 U.S. 558, 71 S.Ct. 408, 95 L.Ed. 534, letters of complaint from
customers offered as a reason for cancellation of dealer's franchise, to rebut contention
that franchise was revoked for refusal to finance sales through affiliated finance com-
pany. The effect is to exclude from hearsay the entire category of "verbal acts" and
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cites a section of the first edition of McCormick1 4 which offers a defini-
tion of hearsay which includes a requirement of a "statement being
offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein"
245
and which is described as ambiguous with respect to "the problem of
whether acts evincing belief are to be treated as hearsay when offered
to prove the facts believed. ' 246 The Advisory Committee's Note to
Federal Rule 801 simply cannot be regarded as having given Congress
notice that Federal Rule 801(c) would change the common law and
create a new hearsay exception.
Writers on the Federal Rules of Evidence have generally ignored
the question of whether or not Federal Rule 801(c) creates a hearsay
exception for implied assertions based upon assertive conduct. Profes-
sor Rothstein, who pointed out in 1975 that 801(c) was ambiguous on
this point,247 now states that the Federal Rules "make no provision for
words being" an implied statement.248 Conversely, the Second Edition
of McCormick (published in 1972 and supplemented in 1978) declares
that Federal Rule 801 does create a hearsay exception for implied as-
sertions based upon assertive conduct.249 No explanation or argument
is given to support these statements, but the language used in McCor-
mick suggests that the writer of these portions of the revised McCor-
mick would deny that Federal Rule 801(c) is ambiguous. These
portions of the Second Edition of McCormick use the words "assertive
statements not offered to prove what is asserted" to refer to implied
assertions based upon assertive conduct.2 50 They do so as if it were
indisputable that that was what those words meant. That assumption
is, of course, in conflict with the position taken in the section of the
First Edition of McCormick cited by the Federal Advisory Commit-
"verbal parts of an act," in which the statement itself affects the legal rights of the parties
or is a circumstance bearing on conduct affecting their rights.
The definition of hearsay must, of course, be read with reference to the definition of
statement set forth in subdivision (a).
Testimony given by a witness in the course of court proceedings is excluded since
there is compliance with all the ideal conditions for testifying.
Proposed Rules, supra note 10, at 294-95.
244. C. MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 225 (1954) [hereinafted cited as FIRST EDITION OF MC-
CORMICK].
245. Id at 460.
246. Id n.2.
247. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 187, 1975 Supp. 373, quoted in note 222 supra.
248. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES, supra note 222, at 327.
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tee.25 ' That section stated that a definition of hearsay which applied
only to a statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of
matters asserted therein was ambiguous with respect to "the problem of
whether acts evincing belief are to be treated as hearsay when offered
to prove the facts believed. ' 252 That section of the First Edition has in
fact been carried forward into the Second Edition virtually without
change.253
Some support for the argument that Federal Evidence Rule 801(c)
should be read as creating a hearsay exception for implied assertions
based upon assertive conduct can be found in Professor Finman's arti-
cle on implied assertions under the Uniform Rules254 and in a student
note,255 but what is probably the most important evidence on the mean-
ing of Federal Evidence Rule 801(c) is, fittingly enough, silence. Judge
Weinstein and Professor Berger,256 Professor Falklnor,257 Professor
Moore and Ms. Bendix,258 Professors Lempert and Saltzburg,25 9 and
Professor Lilly,260 all ignore the possibility that Federal Evidence Rule
801(c) might be read as creating a hearsay exception for implied asser-
tions based upon assertive conduct. Their silence is impressive evi-
dence, which is admissible (since the rule against hearsay certainly does
not apply to legal argument) to prove that Federal Evidence Rule
801(c) does not create a hearsay exception for implied assertions based
upon assertive conduct.
Finally, Oklahoma has a third reason to reject a reading of Section
801(3) that would create a new hearsay exception-the legislative his-
tory contained in the Oklahoma Evidence Subcommittee's Note to pro-
posed Oklahoma Rule 801. There is not even an indirect reference to
implied assertions in the Oklahoma Note. Instead, the Subcommittee
stated: "The definition of 'hearsay' in [Section 801(3)] follows familiar
25 1. See note 243 supra.
252. FIRST EDITION OF MCCORMICK, supra note 244, § 225, at 460 & n.2.
253. McCORMICK, supra note 11, § 246.
254. See Finman, supra note 21, at 684 n.8. for an argument that a statement offered to sup-
port an implied assertion "is not offered to prove the matter stated in it and therefore is not
hearsay" under UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 63. But see FIRST EDITION OF MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 244, § 229 n.32 and Falknor, "See-Do," supra note 191, at 137-38, both of which
ignore that possible interpretation of UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 63.
255. Note, State of Mind The Elusive Exception, 9 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 203-07 (1976).
But see SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 75, at 511.
256. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 14, 1 801(a)[01], 801(a)[02], I 801(c)[01].
257. Falknor, Hearsay, supra note 81, at 594-95.
258. 11 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 801.10 (1976).
259. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 351 (1977).
260. LILLY, supra note 25, § 5 1.
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doctrine. It is generally consistent with Oklahoma law though authori-
ties adopting the formulation of Rule 801(c) are sparse and diverse in
their substance."26'
261. Proposed Code, supra note 10, at 2644 (citations omitted).
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